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“Hold” On:
The Remarkably Resilient,
Constitutionally Dubious
48-Hour Hold
Steven J. Mulroy †
Abstract
This Article discusses the surprisingly widespread, little-known practice
of “48-hour holds,” where police detain a suspect—without charge or
access to bail—for up to 48 hours to continue their investigation; at
the end of 48 hours, they either charge or release him. Although it has
not been discussed in the scholarly literature, this practice has
occurred in a number of large jurisdictions over the past few decades,
and continues today in some of them. The “holds” often take place,
admittedly or tacitly, without the probable cause needed to charge a
defendant, and thus in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Even
with probable cause, this Article argues, it is constitutionally
problematic to deliberately detain a person for 48 hours without
charging him with a crime. This Article traces the development of the
practice over the last few decades, including its surprising persistence
despite repeated (though sporadic) criticism by courts and the media.
It rejects the justifications for the practice asserted by its defenders
and suggests that the practice improperly allows the prosecution to
achieve two “end runs” around normal procedural protections. First,
the practice allows detention for 48 hours without starting the clock
for a prompt bail determination. Second, it delays for 48 hours the
point at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel protections
against interrogation attach, thus allowing an extra 48 hours for the
police to “sweat” the defendant and potentially achieve confessions.

†

Associate Professor, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, University of
Memphis. The author participated in public discussions of the 48-hour
hold controversy in his role as a Shelby County Commissioner. He
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Introduction
For the past several decades, a number of local jurisdictions around
the country have had a publicly acknowledged, routinized procedure
for holding criminal suspects against their will for up to 48 hours
without charging them with a crime, in order for the police to
continue their investigation of the suspect. In many (if not most)
cases, this was done without proof amounting to probable cause—
either with no judicial scrutiny or judicial scrutiny that was pro forma
at best. In all cases, there was no formal charge; thus, there was no
access to bail, or a bail hearing, or starting of the clock for a prompt
bail determination. Suspects were routinely interrogated during this
period. At the end of the prescribed period—variously 20 to 72 hours,
but usually 48—the suspect would either be charged or released. 1
Despite occasional criticism of this practice by courts, the bar, and
the press, the practice continued, resulting in many thousands of
such detentions.
These policies and practices occurred in various jurisdictions
around the United States, at various periods of time, with some
continuing to the present day. Jurisdictions with this practice include
1.

See infra Part I. It is difficult to say precisely how many of the
detainees were charged versus released, although in some jurisdictions a
significant fraction of them were released. See infra notes 72–77 and
accompanying text (discussing Memphis’s uses of an early version of the
48-hour hold). This Article argues that even where the suspect is
ultimately charged, the 48-hour hold procedure raises constitutional and
policy concerns.
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Chicago, Illinois, which had a written police policy from 1978 to 1986 2
and a recorded complaint as late as November 2002; 3 Austin, Texas
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 4 which has never formally been discontinued, and an unofficial policy in Missouri at least throughout the
1990s. 5 An even more aggressive version from Orleans Parish,
Louisiana, purported to allow a magistrate to extend a detention by
48 hours even after finding no probable cause. 6 This practice occurred
within the last few years.
While the maximum period involved is 48 hours, shorter periods are
sometimes used. For example, relying on a state statute requiring
warrantless arrestees to be charged within 20 hours or released, local
authorities in Missouri have deliberately detained persons without charge
on “20-hour hold[s].” 7 In some Missouri jurisdictions, there was an
2.

See Chicago Police, General Order 78-1 (Jan. 1, 1978), rescinded by
Teletype Order No. 05328 (July 1, 1986); see also Robinson v. City of
Chicago, 638 F. Supp. 186, 188, 192 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (finding that
Paragraph VI.C.2 of General Order 78-1 permitted prolonged detention in
order for officers to continue investigations and holding that the policy
was “repugnant to Fourth Amendment rights”), rev’d on standing
grounds, 868 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1989); Bullock v. Dioguardi, 847 F. Supp.
553, 563 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (alleging prolonged detention under 78-1 even
though the policy had apparently been rescinded); Willis v. Bell, 726 F.
Supp. 1118, 1127 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (following Robinson and granting
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff for prolonged detention under 78-1).

3.

Second Amended Complaint at 1, Lopez v. City of Chicago, No. 01 C
1823, 2005 WL 711986 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2002) (alleging that the
Chicago Police Department’s “hold past court call” procedure is
unconstitutional).

4.

E-mail from Prof. Steve Russell, Indiana University-Bloomington School
of Law, former Municipal Court Judge, Austin, Texas (July 11, 2012,
7:33 AM) (on file with author). Prof. Russell observed this practice
while a sitting judge and while serving on a Municipal Court Task Force
on jail overcrowding. Id. Judge David Phillips of Travis County, Austin,
Texas, also confirmed the use to the procedure as late as the 1990s.
Correspondence with Judge David Phillips of Travis County, Austin,
Texas (July 12, 2012, 10:03 AM) (on file with author).

5.

See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 928 F. Supp. 910, 933 & n.14 (W.D.
Mo. 1996) (noting that officers were relying upon an “oxymoronic
interpretation” of section 544.170 of the Missouri Revised Code, which
set a time limit on a lawful detention pending evidence gathering, as a
tool to detain suspects for investigative arrests). It is unclear whether
the practice continues today to any extent.

6.

See State v. Wallace, 25 So. 3d 720, 723–27 (La. 2009) (holding that
local magistrate failed to comply with La. Code Crim. Proc. art.
230.2’s requirement that probable cause determinations for detained
criminal suspects be made within 48 hours of arrest); see also Original
Writ Application of the Defendant at 3–4, Louisiana v. Charles (La. Ct.
App. 2009) (No. 2009-K-0477) (on file with author).

7.

Roberts, 928 F. Supp. at 933 (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 544.170 (2011)).
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“unwritten policy” of automatically holding all domestic violence suspects
for the full statutory 20-hour period.8 In at least one case, police adhered
to this policy even after a judge ordered such a suspect released. 9
Litigants in Michigan have alleged a similar unofficial policy regarding
domestic violence suspects. 10 At least one federal court has suggested
that such a deliberate policy of extensive detention without charge,
despite the availability of a magistrate, might violate the Fourth
Amendment.11
At the other temporal extreme is Cleveland, Ohio. Until as
recently as last year, the Cleveland Police Department had a policy of
detaining persons without charge for up to 72 hours. At the end of
this period, the suspect would either be formally charged or released. 12
An administrative law judge discontinued the practice in 2012. 13

8.

See In re Conard, 944 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Mo. 1997) (en banc). The
statute actually required all types of criminal suspects to be released
within 20 hours if the suspect had not yet been charged. Id. at 193 n.1.
That statute now authorizes pre-charge detention for up to 24 hours
before charges must be filed. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 544.170 (2011).

9.

In re Conard, 944 S.W.2d at 194.

10.

Davis v. City of Detroit, No. 98-1254, 1999 WL 1111482, at *1 (6th Cir.
Nov. 24, 1999).

11.

Id. (citing Brennan v. Twp. of Northville, 78 F.3d 1152, 1155–56 (6th
Cir. 1996)). The Sixth Circuit has distinguished (1) a practice of
deliberately holding such suspects for the full statutory period despite
the availability of a magistrate, which is constitutionally suspect, from
(2) a constitutionally valid policy against releasing such suspects prior
to 20 hours unless a magistrate has reviewed their case. See Turner v.
City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 639–40 (6th Cir. 2005). The latter
constitutional approach is an official policy in some Michigan
jurisdictions, relying on state statutes that allow police to issue cash
bonds to misdemeanants, but which forbid police from releasing
misdemeanor domestic assault suspects in the first 20 hours unless they
can be brought before a magistrate. Id. at 639 (citing Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 780.581(1) (West 2007)). Laws such as these allow the
magistrate to consider whether premature release might endanger a
family member involved in the alleged altercation with the defendant,
and whether additional hours of detention might allow those potential
victims to relocate or take other protective action. Because this
procedure is still predicated on making best efforts to promptly bring a
defendant before a magistrate, it is analytically distinct from a blanket
“20-hour hold minimum” policy, and thus not as vulnerable to
constitutional challenge.

12.

E-mail from Professor Yuri Linetsky, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law, Cleveland, Ohio (July 18, 2012, 1:38 PM) (on file with
author). Professor Linetsky learned about this practice while taking
courses at the local police academy. Id.

13.

Id.
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But, by far, the broadest practice is in Tennessee, where several
jurisdictions have had internal policies of placing certain suspects “on
48-hour hold,” did so fairly frequently, and in some cases, still do.14
The purpose of the hold has been to allow the police extra time to
develop their investigation. If the investigation is fruitful, the suspect
would be charged; if not, he would be released. Sometimes these
detentions were done by court order and sometimes on the authority
of law enforcement alone. In no case was it expressly authorized by
statute or court rule.
In one 10-day period in 2012, three separate developments focused
attention on this little-discussed, surprisingly frequent, and
constitutionally suspect practice. On March 14, the Tennessee Court
of Criminal Appeals reversed a first-degree murder conviction in a
scathing opinion criticizing the use of “48-hour hold[s]” by the
Memphis Police Department. 15 This was the third time this court had
issued an opinion criticizing the practice. 16
Independently, on March 21, the County Commission for Shelby
County, Tennessee, (which includes Memphis) conducted a previously
scheduled hearing on the use of 48-hour holds. The supervising judge
of the court approved such holds in Shelby County and defended the
practice. 17 Two days later, a federal district court issued an opinion
after a bench trial holding the sheriff of nearby Lauderdale County,
Tennessee, liable under § 1983 for continuing the practice despite a
2010 court order enjoining it. 18
This confluence of events triggered sustained media attention and
controversy, 19 including editorials questioning the practice 20 and state14.

See infra Part I.

15.

State v. Bishop, No. W2010-01207-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 938969, at *7
(Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 2012).

16.

See State v. Rush, No. W2005-02809-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2884457 at
*1 & n.2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 11, 2006) (“We know of no authority
which would permit the police to book a person ‘into jail on a 48-hour
hold,’ or as additionally referred to in the record as placing a person ‘on
the hook,’ without preferring any criminal charges in order that the police
could complete their investigation, as suggested by the testimony.”); State
v. Ficklin, No. W2000-01534-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1011470, at *8
(Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 27, 2001) (“[T]he seizure of the defendant for
custodial interrogation was [without probable cause and] illegal.”).

17.

Transcript of Shelby County Commission Committee #4 Proceedings,
Mar. 21, 2012, at 9 [hereinafter Shelby County Commission Transcript]
(testimony of Shelby County General Sessions Court Judge Loyce
Lambert Ryan) (on file with author).

18.

Rhodes v. Lauderdale Cnty., No. 2:10-cv-02068-JPM-dkv, 2012 WL
4434722 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 24, 2012).

19.

See, e.g., Daniel Connolly, Court Rejects 48-Hour Holds, Com. Appeal
(Memphis), Mar. 23, 2012, at A1.
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ments from the police and prosecutors’ offices defending it. 21 Within a
week, the uproar resulted in a decision to discontinue the practice in
Shelby County. 22 But both the chief judge overseeing the practice in
that county 23 and the District Attorney helping to implement it 24
continued thereafter to defend the holds, and the District Attorney
announced that the State would appeal the case finding the practice
unconstitutional to the Tennessee Supreme Court. 25 Additionally, the
practice continued until 2012 in Lauderdale County, 26 and apparently
still continues in Tipton County, 27 as well as Hardeman and McNairy
Counties—the other counties in the state’s 25th Judicial District.28
20.

Editorial, 48-Hour Detentions, Com. Appeal (Memphis), Mar. 26, 2012,
at A5.

21.

48-Hour Holds Defended; Will Continue, Com. Appeal (Memphis),
Mar. 24, 2012, http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2012/mar/24/
officials-note-declines-in-crime/.

22.

Lawrence Buser et al., Sheriff’s Office Will No Longer Hold Prisoners
for 48-Hour Detention, Com. Appeal (Memphis), Mar. 30, 2012,
http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2012/mar/30/sheriffs-officeno-longer-hold-prisoners-detention/.

23.

Transcript of Shelby County Commission Committee #4 Proceedings,
Apr. 18, 2012, at 1 (testimony of Shelby County General Sessions Court
Judge Loyce Lambert Ryan) (on file with author).

24.

Buser et al., supra note 22.

25.

Id.; see also 48-Hour Holds Defended; Will Continue, supra note 21
(quoting District Attorney Amy Weirich as defending the practice). The
State Attorney General’s appellate pleading does not explicitly list as an
issue for appeal the constitutionality of 48-hour holds, focusing instead
on challenges related to the suppression of the statement obtained
during the 48-hour hold in that case—an argument which may or may
not require a ruling on the 48-hour hold’s overall validity. See
Application of State of Tennessee for Permission to Appeal, at 2, 7–10,
State v. Bishop (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 2012) (No. W2010-01207SC-R11-CD). The State does, however, criticize as “flawed analysis” the
intermediate appellate court’s discussion of the police department’s use
of 48-hour holds. Id. at 12. The appeal was granted and the oral
argument was held on April 3, 2013.

26.

Rhodes v. Lauderdale Cnty., No. 2:10-cv-02068-JPM-dkv, 2012 WL
4434722, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 24, 2012) (indicating that relief for
48-hour holds was still being sought in April of 2012).

27.

See List of Arrests, Tipton County Sheriff’s Office (on file with author)
[hereinafter Tipton County List of Arrests].

28.

Telephone Interview by Razvan Axente with Gary Antrican, Pub.
Defender, Tenn. 25th Jud. Dist. (May 25, 2012). Mr. Antrican stated
that the 48-hour hold is used in the 25th Judicial District, except for
Fayette County. Id. District Attorney Mark Davidson confirmed that
the procedure is not used in Fayette County. Telephone Interview by
Razvan Axente with Mark Davidson, Dist. Attorney, Fayette Cnty.,
25th Jud. Dist. (May 23, 2012).
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Although apparently rare, the practice survives in Tennessee’s 31st
Judicial District as well. 29 Moreover, as indicated above, a milder
version of the practice continues in parts of Michigan and Missouri in
cases involving allegations of domestic abuse.
The practice represents a basic misunderstanding of Supreme
Court case law in the area of pretrial detentions and the Fourth
Amendment. It was (and is) a systematic violation of Fourth
Amendment principles carried out openly—despite years of criticism
by media, local government, and the courts.
Defenders of this surprisingly resilient practice maintain that the
detentions take place based upon probable cause, that they are little
distinguishable from regular arrests, and that any controversy is
misplaced concern over formalities. 30 But there is reason to believe that
many detentions take place without probable cause. And, even with
probable cause, detaining people without charge, and without access to
bail, seems to constitute an independent constitutional violation. 31
The phenomenon merits analysis. It has sprouted up repeatedly at
different times, including within the last few years, all around the
nation. It continues today in some places. The spirited defense of the
practice in Shelby County, Tennessee, a major practitioner, suggests
it might resurface in years to come. In any event, it appears not to
have been discontinued in other parts of Tennessee, and continues in
other parts of the country in the specific context of domestic violence
cases. Even when the practice is supposedly discontinued, significant
misunderstanding of the law in this area can persist among law
enforcement officials. 32 It suggests a broader problem of misunderstanding by local judges and police of the principles explained in
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, which held that warrantless
arrestees “must promptly be brought before a neutral magistrate for a
judicial determination of probable cause,” with delays over 48 hours
presumptively unreasonable. 33
More broadly, significant issues lurk here about the principles
underlying our rules governing pretrial detention. The issues are cast
29.

Telephone Interview by Razvan Axente with Thomas J. Miner,
Assistant Dist. Attorney, 31st Jud. Dist. (June 20, 2012).

30.

See, e.g., Buser et al., supra note 22 (relating remarks by Shelby
County, Tennessee, District Attorney General Amy Weirich).

31.

See infra Parts II and III.

32.

See Rhodes v. Lauderdale Cnty., No. 2:10-cv-02068-JPM-dkv, 2012 WL
4434722, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 24, 2012) (Lauderdale County officials
erroneously believed the 48-hour hold gave them 48 hours to establish
probable cause and file charges).

33.

Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 53 (1991). The Court
held that delays over 48 hours are presumptively unreasonable. Id. at
56.
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into stark relief by the expansion in recent years of detention
authority related to the war on terror. 34 Suspected “enemy
combatants” have been detained without charge, but only in cases
where there is a perceived grave threat to national security, and only
with much controversy. Additionally, while “investigative detentions”
are common in other countries, 35 they have long been outside the
traditions of the American criminal justice system. The abuses
occurring in other countries from the use of investigative holds remind
us why. 36 The recent (and continuing) use of 48-hour holds in the
United States in nonterrorism cases, with relatively muted (or at least
delayed) public outcry, rebuts the complacent notion that “it can’t
happen here.”
This Article examines the issues surrounding “48-hour holds.”
While it discusses their use generally around the country and analyzes
their constitutionality under federal law, the Article focuses in detail
on the practice in Tennessee, where it seems to be used most
frequently, broadly, and recently. Part I describes the current (or
recent) extent of the practice. Part II discusses the legal problems
with “investigative detentions” and the role that the legal standard of
“probable cause” plays in this analysis. It distinguishes 48-hour holds
34.

See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention
Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 769 (2011) (providing a
detailed overview of the current status of detention for enemy
combatants); Stephanie Cooper Blum, The Why and How of Preventive
Detention in the War on Terror, 26 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 51, 57
(2009) (analyzing the reasoning and lawfulness of the preventive
detention for enemy combatants and suggesting better alternatives).

35.

See, e.g., Matthew Law & Jeremy Opolsky, The Year in Review:
Developments in Canadian Law in 2009–2010, 68 U. Toronto Fac. L.
Rev. 99, 104 (2010) (discussing Canadian case law authorizing
investigative detentions); Amanda L. Tyler, The Counterfactual That
Came To Pass: What If the Founders Had Not Constitutionalized the
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus?, 45 Ind. L. Rev. 3, 15, 18
(2011) (discussing U.K. statutes authorizing investigative detentions in
terrorism cases); cf. Diane Webber, Extreme Measures: Does the United
States Need Preventive Detention To Combat Domestic Terrorism?, 14
Touro Int’l L. Rev. 128, 128 (2010) (noting that France, Israel, and
the U.K. allow “preventive detention,” while the U.S. does not). As used
here, “investigative detention” refers to something other than so-called
“Terry stops” effected pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 35 (1968).

36.

Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15 (1965) (“It . . . cannot be forgotten that
in the early days of the Castro regime [in Cuba], United States citizens
were arrested and imprisoned without charges.”); Amenu v. Holder, 434
Fed. App’x 276, 280 (4th Cir. 2011) (criticizing the Ethiopian
government’s “arbitrary arrest and detention . . . without charge” of
members of the opposing political party); Haile v. Holder, 658 F.3d
1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that Amnesty International had
criticized Eritrea for indefinite detentions and for holding political and
religious dissidents “without charge or trial”).
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from other types of limited detentions that can sometimes occur on
less than probable cause. It argues that 48-hour holds constitutionally
require probable cause but that in practice they often lack it. This
Part also discusses the origin and history of the practice in Tennessee
and its surprising persistence despite repeated (though sporadic)
public criticism. Part III argues that even where 48-hour holds are
supported by probable cause, they are still unconstitutional, both
because the law forbids the detention of persons without charge, and
because 48-hour holds impermissibly delay the determination of bail.
This Part also discusses why law enforcement officials choose the
practice rather than simply charging defendants in the traditional
manner. It rejects the practical explanations for this choice proffered
by the practice’s defenders on the grounds that the practical ends
cited could just as easily be achieved by use of a traditional arrest
and charge. It suggests that the practice may serve as an “end-run”
around traditional safeguards providing bail and preventing
interrogation in violation of the right to counsel.

I.

Recent Practice
A.

Generally

Forty-eight-hour holds are by far the exception, not the rule. A
1999 media survey of 15 major American cities found no city that
used extended holding periods before suspects are charged. 37 But both
within the last few decades and fairly recently, similar pre-charge
holding practices have been prevalent, not just in remote areas, but in
major U.S. cities.
In Missouri, law enforcement used a state statute originally
designed to protect defendants to justify such a practice. Missouri has
a statute stating that persons arrested without the issuance of a
warrant must either be charged or released within 24 hours. 38 In prior
years, that statute specified a period of 20 hours. 39 The statute was
intended to set an outer limit on how long police could hold a suspect
without charging him and giving him a probable cause hearing, and it
did not purport to provide law enforcement with any additional
latitude regarding arrests and detentions. 40 It was not “a sword in the
37.

Chris Conley, Study Hits Police Holding Policy, Com. Appeal
(Memphis), Jan. 30, 1999, at A1 [hereinafter Conley, Study Hits]. The
cities surveyed were Atlanta, San Francisco, Indianapolis, Louisville,
Birmingham, Charlotte, Houston, Austin, Los Angeles, Nashville, San
Antonio, Dallas, Boston, El Paso, and San Diego. Id.

38.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 544.170 (2011).

39.

See United States v. Roberts, 928 F. Supp. 910, 915, 932–33 (W.D. Mo.
1996) (discussing the 20-hour rule’s application to the defendant and
quoting the Missouri statute).

40.

Id. at 933.

823

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3 ·2013
The Remarkably Resilient, Constitutionally Dubious 48-Hour Hold

hands of the police, but rather a shield for the citizen.” 41 Nonetheless,
police seized on this statutory language to defend the Missouri
practice of “a twenty hour hold” 42—deliberately holding suspects
without charge for 20 hours while police attempted to gain the
suspect’s cooperation. 43
Moreover, some local jurisdictions in Missouri and Michigan have
policies, either written or unwritten, of holding domestic violence
suspects for at least 20 or 24 hours, regardless of whether a magistrate
is available to make a probable cause finding. 44 The policy is
apparently intended to ensure that victimized family members of the
accused have sufficient time to relocate or take other protective
measures before the defendant is released. Nonetheless, as a blanket
policy applying to all persons accused of domestic assault, it seems
overbroad. At any rate, to the extent police, pursuant to such
policies, purposely detain defendants past the point at which it is
practicable to bring in a magistrate, they violate the Constitution. 45
In Chicago, police promulgated written General Orders that
authorized investigative detentions. A 1978 General Order authorized
police to detain suspects when “there is a necessity for the detention
of an arrestee for a period of time longer than that which might
routinely be expected, in order that they may continue the
investigation.” 46 This policy was even broader than the typical 48hour hold policy, in that no definite time limit was set. On numerous
occasions, federal courts have found that the purpose of this policy
was to allow for investigative detentions, and thus the policy was
unconstitutional. 47 Despite this, the City of Chicago continued to

41.

Id.

42.

Id. at 933 & n.14.

43.

See id. at 915 (describing this as “the sole purpose of the pick-up”); see
also id. at 932 (describing this position as “advanced unapologetically”
by the prosecution in both its pleadings and witness testimony).

44.

See In re Conard, 944 S.W.2d 191, 193–94 (Mo. 1997) (“It was the
unwritten policy of the St. Charles police department to hold persons
arrested for domestic violence for twenty hours . . . .”); Davis v. City of
Detroit, No. 98-1254, 1999 WL 1111482, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 23, 1999)
(holding that a Michigan defendant should have been allowed to proceed
with his action against the city for the policy of holding domestic
violence suspects for at least 20 hours (citing Brennan v. Twp. of
Northville, 78 F.3d 1152, 1155–56 (6th Cir. 1996))).

45.

See infra Part II.

46.

Chicago Police, General Order 78-1, VI-C-2 (Jan. 1, 1978), cited in
Robinson v. Chicago, 638 F. Supp. 186, 188 (N.D. Ill. 1986).

47.

See Bullock v. Dioguardi, 847 F. Supp. 553, 563–64 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(denying the City’s motion to dismiss the claim that police officers used
coercive tactics in violation of the fourth amendment); Willis v. Bell,
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defend the practice for years. 48 One federal district court decision had
suggested that the practice had “apparently” been rescinded, 49 but a
case as recent as 2006 addressed a complaint concerning a practice
remarkably similar. 50
In Austin, Texas, this practice continued for many decades,
despite the absence of an express statute or police policy authorizing
it. 51 It did so notwithstanding fairly aggressive criticism from the local
judiciary. 52 Affected suspects were officially listed as being held “on
suspicion of” a particular charge, even though not actually charged. 53
Nor have the errors necessarily improved over time. As recently as
2009 and 2010, in New Orleans, Louisiana, the practice was arguably
more constitutionally suspect. After a defendant was held for many
hours, sitting “initial appearance” judges holding probable cause
hearings would regularly find a lack of probable cause but, nevertheless,
erroneously order the defendant held for an additional 48 hours,
misapplying the reasoning from McLaughlin. 54 Furthermore, as recently
726 F. Supp. 1118, 1127 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding that the City violated
Willis’s due process rights by detaining him “beyond the time needed to
perform the administrative steps incident to his arrest”); Robinson v.
City of Chicago, 638 F. Supp. 186, 188 (N.D. Ill. 1986), rev’d on
standing grounds, 868 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The Fourth
Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a
prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest, regardless
of whether the original arrest was supported by an officer’s on-the-scene
determination of probable cause. Paragraph C-2 permits police officers
to circumvent this requirement and for that reason is contrary to the
Fourth Amendment rights of those being detained.” (citation omitted)).
48.

See, e.g., Willis, 726 F. Supp. at 1127; Bostic v. City of Chicago, No. 86
C 5482, 1991 WL 96430, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 1991).

49.

Bullock, 847 F. Supp. at 563. The indefinite hold policy of General
Order 78-1, VI-C-2 was rescinded on July 1, 1986 by Teletype Order
No. 05328. It was replaced by a policy that required a “Probable Cause
to Detain Hearing” to be “held within 24 hours from the time of arrest.”
Chicago Police, Teletype Order No. 00415 (Jan. 15, 1986).

50.

See Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711, 714–15, 720–22 (7th Cir.
2006) (discussing complaint of alleged unconstitutional warrantless
confinement for four days).

51.

E-mail from Prof. Stephen Russell, supra note 4. Professor Russell
observed this practice while a sitting judge and while serving on a
Municipal Court Task Force on jail overcrowding. Id.

52.

Id.

53.

Correspondence with Judge David Phillips, supra note 4.

54.

See State v. Wallace, 25 So. 3d 720, 724–25 (La. 2009) (criticizing the
Orleans Parish Criminal District Court for consistently having problems
“adhering to the constitutional guidelines” for determining probable
cause as interpreted by the Supreme Court in McLaughlin and codified
by state law).
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as last year, Cleveland Police were routinely holding suspects without
charge for up to 72 hours.55 Not only is the period of constitutionally
suspect detention longer in this case, the fact that it exceeds 48 hours
disqualifies even the (ultimately unconvincing) argument that it is
faithful to the Supreme Court ruling in McLaughlin.
The frequency of 48-hour holds varies by jurisdiction, but the
practice is by no means freakishly rare. Tennessee provides a good
example of the range. In Lauderdale County, the practice occurred
approximately 10 times a month.56 In Shelby County, it occurs
approximately 1,000 times per year. 57 A sample review of arrest records
in Tipton County suggests an average of about nine instances a month
(at least 95 instances during an 11-month period between August 2009
and June 2010.) 58 Nonetheless, this represents a relatively small fraction
of all arrests in these jurisdictions.59 In the Judicial District covering
Van Buren and Warren Counties, the District Attorney’s Office
acknowledged use of the practice, but indicated that it is used less than
once per year. 60
B.

In Tennessee

Although there are thousands of examples in recent years in
Tennessee, it is localized even within the state. Surveys of criminal
justice officials from around Tennessee confirmed the practice’s use in
only 4 of 31 Judicial Districts. 61
A majority of Tennessee District Attorney Offices surveyed stated
that they considered the practice unlawful. 62 This comports with the
55.

E-mail from Prof. Yuri Linetsky, supra note 12.

56.

See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Partial Summary Judgment at
5, Rhodes v. Lauderdale Cnty. (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 9, 2010) (No. 2:10-cv02068-JPM-dkv) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Memorandum] (citing deposition
testimony of Lauderdale County Sheriff Steve Sanders referencing
approximately 115 such detentions in a 13-month period).

57.

Judicial Commissioners Annual Report, Jan. 2011–Dec. 2011, submitted
by Hon. Loyce Lambert Ryan, Supervising Judge for the Judicial
Comm’rs, General Sessions Court, Shelby Cnty., Tenn. (Mar. 8, 2012)
[hereinafter Judicial Commissioners Report].

58.

Tipton County List of Arrests, supra note 27.

59.

See, e.g., Memorandum from General Sessions Criminal Court Judicial
Comm’rs (Shelby County) to General Sessions Judge Larry Potter (n.d.)
[hereinafter Potter Memorandum] (on file with author) (noting that 48hour holds represent less than one percent of arrests in Shelby County).

60.

Telephone Interview by Razvan Axente with Thomas J. Miner,
Assistant Dist. Att’y, 31st Jud. Dist. (June 20, 2012).

61.

Survey conducted by Razvan Axente from May 7, 2012 to May 25, 2012
(on file with author).

62.

Id.; see also e-mail from Razvan Axente to Steven J. Mulroy (May 22,
2012, 8:05 PM) (on file with author). One e-mail from a District
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view of state law enforcement, as Tennessee Bureau of Investigation
agents are apparently trained that investigative holds are
impermissible. 63 During a previous controversy over an antecedent to
the 48-hour hold, a Memphis Police Department representative had
publicly acknowledged that arresting someone for investigative
purposes was “misconduct.” 64 Nonetheless, the Director of the
Memphis Police Department recently defended his department’s use
of 48-hour holds. 65
The mechanics of the procedure vary by county. The common
theme is the detention of a suspect without charge for investigative
purposes for up to 48 hours. At the end of the 48 hours, the suspect is
either charged or released.
In Lauderdale County, the Sheriff’s Department would typically
bring in a suspect to the jail and fill out a form indicating that the
person is to be held for 48 hours “for investigation.” 66 The form is not
reviewed by a magistrate prior to the beginning of the “48-hour hold.”
The form calls for the category of crime for which the person is to be
investigated, but that is not an actual charge. Indeed, the form
indicates this hold “for investigation” to be an alternative to the part
of the form where an actual charge would be identified. 67 These
detentions occur when the officers do not have sufficient evidence to
charge a detainee with a criminal offense. 68 If the person is not
charged within 48 hours, he is released. 69 Jail officials take the
Attorney surveyed stated: “No, I do not have anything like that. It is
wrong.” See e-mail from Jimmy Dunn, Attorney Gen., 4th Jud. Dist., to
Razvan Axente (Apr. 23, 2012, 1:22 PM) (on file with author).
63.

See Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Motion to Cite
Defendant for Contempt of Court at 42, 48–49, Rhodes v. Lauderdale
Cnty., No. 2:10-cv-02068-JPM-dkv (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 21, 2012), ECF
No. 63 [hereinafter Lauderdale Contempt Order] (containing testimony
of TBI Agent Mark Lane Reynolds regarding his training about the
improperness of investigative holds). The defendants stipulated to
liability, and the court awarded damages to plaintiffs. Rhodes, 2012 WL
4434722, at *1.

64.

Chris Conley, On the Hook: Many Suspects Dangle in Limbo, Com.
Appeal (Memphis), Nov. 3, 1998, at A1 [hereinafter Conley, On the
Hook] (quoting Memphis Police Deputy Chief Walter Crews).

65.

48-Hour Holds Defended; Will Continue, supra note 21.

66.

See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, supra note 56, at 4–5 & n.10 (discussing
detention booking procedure at the Lauderdale County Jail); id. at
Exhibit 6 (Lauderdale County Sheriff’s Department Detention Request
Form).

67.

Id. at 5.

68.

Id. at 4 & n.7 (citing deposition testimony of Lauderdale County Sheriff
Steve Sanders).

69.

Id. at 4.
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detainee’s personal property, issue jail clothing and bedding, and
generate a mug shot. 70 Such persons are not eligible for bond. 71
In Shelby County, law enforcement will apply to a magistrate, or
“Judicial Commissioner,” for a 48-hour hold determination. 72 The
Judicial Commissioner will sign a form stating that there is probable
cause to believe that the defendant has committed a crime and
authorizing the suspect to be detained for up to 48 hours for further
investigation. 73 At that time, the defendant is not yet charged, 74
meaning both that the prosecution has not yet filed an indictment,
information, or presentment, and also that law enforcement has not
filed an affidavit of complaint. 75 Law enforcement has that long to
either charge the defendant or to release him. 76 Such suspects are also
held at the jail, and are also ineligible for bond during this period. 77
In Tipton County, there do not appear to be standardized, written
rules concerning the practice. Nonetheless, Tipton County arrest
records show that suspects who are taken into custody are either listed
by the offense for which they are charged or, on some occasions, listed
simply as “Hold for Investigation.” 78 Because the decision to “hold for
investigation” has already been made and recorded at the time the
70.

Id. at 5.

71.

Id.

72.

See Judicial Commissioners Report, supra note 57, at 7–8.

73.

See Order Granting 48 Hour Detention for Probable Cause (form used in
Shelby County General Sessions Courts) [hereinafter 48-hour hold Form], in
Memorandum from Debra L. Fessenden, Assistant Cnty. Att’y, on 48 Hour
Detention Orders, to Steve Mulroy, Cnty. Comm’r (Nov. 19, 2010), available
at http://media.commercialappeal.com/media/static/Mulroy_Memo.pdf.
There is some reason to doubt that the procedure really does require, in
all instances, probable cause to charge a defendant with a crime. See
infra Part II.A.2.

74.

See 48-hour hold Form, supra note 73 (“The defendant may be held in
the Shelby County Jail pending the presentment of a formal charging
instrument to the appropriate magistrate.”).

75.

Judicial Commissioners Report, supra note 57, at 7 (noting that 48-hour
hold orders were used in Shelby County when there is not yet probable
cause to fill out an affidavit of complaint).

76.

See 48-hour hold Form, supra note 73 (“[T]he defendant shall be
released . . . [within 48 hours] unless a formal charging instrument has
been presented within that time.”).

77.

See Conley, On the Hook, supra note 64 (“Police don’t want a suspect
charged and released on bond on one crime only to find he likely
committed other crimes. . . . A person can get a bond only if he is
charged.”); Conley, Study Hits, supra note 37.

78.

See, e.g., Tipton County List of Arrests, supra note 27 (listing the
“charge” for a number of arrestees as “hold for investigation”).
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arrestee is first brought to the police station, it seems to be made by
law enforcement alone, without prior judicial authorization. This
would be consistent with the procedure used by Lauderdale County,
which also lies within the 25th Judicial District. 79 The procedure used
in the other counties (Fayette, Hardeman, and McNairy) in the same
Judicial District appears to be similar. 80
Some, but not all, participants in the procedure characterize this
detention as an “arrest.” 81 On the one hand, the defendant clearly is
not free to leave, and the detention is in a holding facility, so it seems
clearly to be an arrest. On the other hand, unlike an arrest, bond is
not available, nor does the detention seem to start the clock for a
prompt bail determination. Nor does confinement continue, as with an
arrest, until either trial or a judicial decision to release pending trial.
Instead, with a 48-hour hold, the confinement lasts only 48 hours, at
which point the defendant is either charged or released.

II. Investigative Detentions
It is precisely the temporary, contingent, pre-charge nature of the
detention—the notion that the detention will only last up to 48 hours,
unless the defendant is charged—that raises significant constitutional
issues with the practice of 48-hour holds. These characteristics make
the practice seem indistinguishable from an overly long and
unconstitutional “investigative detention.”
Under our scheme of constitutional criminal procedure,
“investigative detentions” are unconstitutional. 82 The United States
79.

Tennessee
Judicial
District
Map,
Tenn.
State
Courts,
https://www.tncourts.gov/administration/judicial-resources/judicialdistrict-map (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).

80.

Telephone Interview by Razvan Axente with Gary Antrican, Pub.
Defender for the 25th Jud. Dist. (May 25, 2012). But see Telephone
Interview by Razvan Axente with Mike Dunavant, Dist. Att’y for
Fayette Cnty. (June 2012) (stating that the practice is not used in
Fayette County).

81.

Compare Shelby County Commission Transcript, supra note 17, at 9
(testimony of Shelby County General Sessions Court Judge Loyce
Lambert Ryan) (characterizing a 48-hour hold as an arrest), with State
v. Bishop, No. W2010–01207–CCA–R3–CD, 2012 WL 938969, at *6
(Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 2012) (rejecting law enforcement agents’
apparent belief that hold was not an arrest, although the defendant was
not free to leave), appeal granted, Aug. 15, 2012.

82.

As used here, the term “investigative detentions” refers to a practice
where law enforcement removes a suspect from where he is found to
another location and then forcibly holds him there for a significant
period of time—more than a few hours—while law enforcement attempts
to develop evidence sufficient to meet the “probable cause” standard for
an arrest. The term does not refer to so-called “Terry stops,” which
allow law enforcement to briefly detain a suspect at or near where he is
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Supreme Court has so stated on multiple occasions. 83 So have courts
in Tennessee. 84 Lower federal courts have also said so specifically in
the context of “hold” procedures. 85
found for a far shorter period of time—typically less than an hour—
based on the legal standard of “reasonable suspicion.” See infra Part
II.A.1. However, some commentators use the term “investigative
detention” to refer to Terry stops. See, e.g., George Coppolo,
Investigative Detention, Conn. Office Legis. Res. (Report No. 2007R-0036) (Dec. 28, 2006), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/rpt/2007-R0036.htm (using “Terry Stop” and “investigative stop” interchangeably).
Nor should the term be confused with “preventive detentions,” which
refers to the practice of holding someone pending trial based on a
finding that they present a danger of committing further crimes.
Although the Supreme Court has upheld “preventive detentions,” it has
done so in the limited context of a judicial hearing with due process
protections, such as the right to counsel and cross-examination, and
requires the prosecution to prove with “clear and convincing evidence”—
a standard higher than probable cause—that detention pending trial is
necessary to prevent a danger to the community. See United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 743–44 (1987) (granting detention motion because
no condition of release would ensure the safety of the community). This
situation is analytically distinct from 48-hour holds, and it provides no
support for the legality of 48-hour holds.
83.

See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979) (holding
detention for custodial interrogation unconstitutional); Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975) (finding an arrest that was “both in design and
execution . . . investigatory” unconstitutional); Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721, 726–27 (1969) (same); see also Cnty. of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (explaining that delay after
warrantless arrest before being brought to magistrate is unreasonable if
“for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest”);
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932) (“An arrest may
not be used as a pretext to search for evidence.”).

84.

See State v. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d 666, 676 (Tenn. 1996) (holding
that a confession obtained during an illegal detention violated the
Fourth Amendment (citing McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56)); State v.
Bishop, No. W2010-01207-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 938969, at *11 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Mar. 24, 2012) (“The rankly unconstitutional 48-hour hold
utilized in this case is the product of a police department policy, a
policy condemned by this court repeatedly in the past. . . .), appeal
granted, Aug. 15, 2012); State v. Delashmitt, No. E2007-00399-CCA-R9CD, 2008 WL 3245513, at *17 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 7, 2008)
(holding that a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated
when he was held for more than 48 hours while officers continued to
investigate and build a case against him).

85.

See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 928 F. Supp. 910, 915 (W.D. Mo.
1996) (citing scholarship that criticizes the practice of investigatory
detention); Robinson v. City of Chicago, 638 F. Supp. 186, 192 (N.D.
Ill. 1986) (criticizing policy of detaining suspects “so that police officers
may continue the investigation” or to “build a case against a defendant
while he is in jail”).
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This approach contrasts the United States with many other
countries. The United Kingdom currently provides by statute for
investigative detentions in terrorism cases. 86 If a police officer
“reasonably suspects” someone of terrorism, the officer can place that
person in detention for up to 48 hours without charge. 87 At that
point, the officer must bring the suspect before a magistrate, who is
empowered, based on a finding of need for continued evidence
gathering, to continue to detain the suspect for an additional seven
days, at the end of which the magistrate may extend the detention for
one final seven-day period. 88 Canada also provides for investigative
detentions and does not limit them to terrorism cases. 89 Similarly,
investigative detentions for significant periods of time without charge
are common in other countries. 90
In recent years, there has been discussion about whether United
States law was evolving to allow investigative detentions in the
limited context of terrorism cases. 91 Given that the Court and
Congress have given at least partial blessing to the detention of
suspected “enemy combatants” without formal charges, there may be
something to that. 92 Indeed, one scholar has argued that United
States law has become even more permissive on this front than the

86.

See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (U.K.), available at http://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents.

87.

Id. § 41.

88.

Id. sch. 8, pt. III, para. 36.

89.

See Law & Opolsky, supra note 35, at 104 (“[O]n a proper
interpretation of the law, investigative detentions can be lawfully used
for suspected offenses.” (citing R. v. Yeh, 2009 SKCA 112 (Can.))).

90.

See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15 (1965) (Cuba); Amenu v.
Holder, 434 Fed. App’x 276, 280 (4th Cir. 2011) (Ethiopia); Haile v.
Holder, 658 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2011) (Eritrea).

91.

See, e.g., Tyler, supra note 35, at 10–11 (discussing prior use of
preventive national security detentions in the absence of suspension
legislation and the current legislative proposals seeking to revive the
procedure when dealing with suspected terrorists).

92.

See Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107–
40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (granting the President the authority to “use
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations,
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001”); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (holding that pursuant to the
AUMF, a citizen of the United States, at least where apprehended on
the battlefield of a theater of war abroad, may be held as an “enemy
combatant” without criminal charges for the duration of a war, after
being given certain minimal due process protections).
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United Kingdom, despite the latter’s lack of any constitutional rules
guaranteeing habeas corpus review. 93
Whatever the exact contours of the authority to detain without
charge in the unique context of the war on terror, existing Supreme
Court case law makes clear that investigative detentions are not
permissible in ordinary criminal cases. In County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, the Court listed examples where a judicial probable
cause determination would be said to be delayed unreasonably, even if
conducted within 48 hours. 94 Crucially, one example of unreasonable
delay provided was delay “for the purpose of gathering additional
evidence to justify the arrest.” 95 Similarly, in Brown v. Illinois, the
Court invalidated an arrest that it found “investigatory.” 96
More specifically, the “48-hour hold” practice is troublesome in at
least two fundamental ways. First, it seems to allow for detentions on
less than probable cause. Second, it allows for detentions without
charge. The probable cause defect will be discussed first, followed by a
discussion of how this practice came to be.
A.
1.

Probable Cause

The Requirement and Its (Limited) Exceptions

Law enforcement can certainly interact with an individual found
in a public place on less than probable cause. But police may only
take an individual from where they find him and forcibly remove him
to another location upon a finding of probable cause. This
requirement certainly applies to any situation where police remove a
93.

See Tyler, supra note 35, at 19 (“[T]hose held without charges in the
U.K. under its Terrorism Act . . . appear to enjoy greater liberty
protections than their American citizen counterparts.”). It should be
noted, however, that while the Supreme Court has held that Congress
has authority to provide for less stringent protections for suspected
terrorists than for ordinary criminal suspects, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557, 590–93 (2006), it has drawn the line at congressional
removal of habeas corpus protection for such suspects. See Boumedienne
v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (“If the privilege of habeas corpus is
to be denied to the detainees now before us, Congress must act in
accordance with the requirements of the Suspension Clause.”).

94.

Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991).

95.

Id. at 56. The Bishop court emphasized this language from McLaughlin
in explaining why the 48-hour hold policy, which contemplates
investigative detentions, is unconstitutional. State v. Bishop, No.
W2010-01207-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 938969, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Mar. 24, 2012) (“It appears that the MPD has created a procedure to do
that very thing prohibited by the state and federal constitutions: detain
a suspect as an investigative tool specifically designed to acquire
additional evidence to support the detention.”), appeal granted, Aug. 15,
2012.

96.

Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975).
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suspect to police headquarters, whether for custodial interrogation, 97
to be fingerprinted, 98 or to be photographed. 99 It also extends to any
other forced removal of a suspect from his current location to any
other location. In Florida v. Royer, for example, the Supreme Court
held that police could not remove a suspect found in an airport to a
separate airport interrogation room on less than probable cause. 100 In
Hayes v. Florida, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment is
violated where, without probable cause, the police “forcibly remove a
person from his home or other place in which he is entitled to be and
transport him to the police station, where he is detained, although
briefly, for investigative purposes.” 101 Thus, it is clear that the law
generally forbids detaining a suspect for a crime on anything less than
probable cause.
Nonetheless, there are a few discrete situations in which the law
allows a detention of a suspect based on less than probable cause.
These situations are distinct from 48-hour holds.
Terry Stops. One narrow exception, that of a brief “Terry stop”
under the authority of Terry v. Ohio, 102 clearly does not apply to the
48-hour hold situation. In Terry, the Supreme Court held that a law
enforcement agent could briefly detain a person found in public based
on “reasonable suspicion” that the person was involved in criminal
activity. 103 This “reasonable suspicion” standard is lower than
probable cause, but more than a hunch. 104 It requires that the police
officer be able to point to “specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
97.

See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979) (noting that
detention for custodial interrogation intrudes severely on interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment).

98.

See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (“Detentions for the
sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints are no less subject to the
constraints of the Fourth Amendment.”).

99.

See People v. Farley, 90 Cal. App. 3d 851, 862–63 (Ct. App. 1979)
(noting that there is no “relevant distinction” between detention for the
sole purpose of obtaining photographs and detention for the sole purpose
of obtaining fingerprints, as condemned in Davis).

100. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507–08 (1983); see also United States v.
Glover, 957 F.2d 1004, 1009 (2d Cir. 1992) (failure to return suspect’s
identification and request to accompany officers to private office
amounted to a seizure).
101. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985) (emphasis added).
102. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
103. See id. at 23–24 (discussing how the criminal “tradition of armed
violence” would make it unreasonable to deny officers the ability to see
if a suspicious individual was carrying a weapon).
104. Id. at 27.
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that intrusion.” 105 This investigative stop must last no longer than is
reasonably necessary to confirm or dispel the police officer’s
suspicions. 106 Typically, Terry stops should not last much longer than
20 minutes. 107 Detentions of more than a few hours are clearly beyond
the scope of what the Court contemplated in Terry. 108 More
importantly, as noted above, 109 Terry stops generally do not empower
a police officer to remove a suspect to another location. 110 For this
reason, 48-hour holds are not justifiable as Terry stops.
Nontestimonial Identification Orders. One related issue involves
“nontestimonial identification orders.” These orders derive from dicta
in Davis v. Mississippi, where the Supreme Court held that probable
cause was required to bring an unwilling suspect down to the police
station for the purpose of taking fingerprints. 111 Despite holding that
probable cause was required where the police brought a suspect to the
station without a warrant, the Court nonetheless suggested that,
because of the relative lower level of intrusion involved in fingerprint
sampling, “narrowly circumscribed procedures” might be developed
105. Id. at 21.
106. Id. at 26; see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985)
(examining “whether the police diligently pursued a means of
investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions
quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant”).
107. See Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 110.2(1) (1975)
(recommending a maximum of 20 minutes for a Terry stop); Sharpe, 470
U.S. at 683 (declining to provide a set time limit, but ruling on the facts
that a detention lasting 20 minutes was valid).
108. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709–10 (1983) (holding a 90minute detention unreasonable based on the facts of the case); United
States v. Puglisi, 723 F.2d 779, 790 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that an
investigatory detention lasting approximately 140 minutes was
unreasonable); Moya v. United States, 761 F.2d 322, 327 (7th Cir. 1984)
(three-hour seizure unreasonable); United States v. Sanders, 719 F.2d
882, 886–87 (6th Cir. 1983) (detaining luggage for 90 minutes was
unreasonable).
109. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491 (1983)).
110. The Court in Royer did acknowledge that there could be circumstances
where, for reasons of “safety or security,” it might be necessary to
remove a suspect to a nearby location during a Terry stop, despite the
absence of probable cause. Royer, 460 U.S. at 504–05. But the Court
indicated those would be exceptions to the general rule and that police
would need probable cause to convert a brief detention in place to one
where the suspect was forcibly moved to a different location. See id. at
505 (noting that the record did not reflect any “legitimate law
enforcement purposes which justified the detention in the first instance”
that would justify a switch of locations).
111. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).

834

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3 ·2013
The Remarkably Resilient, Constitutionally Dubious 48-Hour Hold

that could constitutionally provide for it under less than probable
cause. 112 The Court later suggested that a judicial order might
constitutionally authorize, on less than probable cause, such a brief
seizure and removal of an individual to a police station for the limited
purpose of fingerprinting. 113 More recently, the Court has
acknowledged that this is still an open issue. 114
A number of states have seized on this dicta and enacted statutes
and rules authorizing police, based on Terry-style “reasonable
suspicion,” to bring a suspect to the police station for the purpose of
taking samples of fingerprints, palm prints, hair, blood, urine, and other
“nontestimonial” identifying information.115 The statutes specify only
“nontestimonial” information to avoid Fifth Amendment problems. The
Supreme Court has held that the privilege against self-incrimination is
not violated where the information extracted from a suspect is “neither
. . . testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act.” 116
Most of these statutes either explicitly authorize such limited
detentions based on the lower standard of “reasonable grounds” 117 or
have been interpreted by state courts to do so.118
The constitutionality of these statutes is an open question. A
number of state courts have upheld these provisions. 119 But at least
112. Id. at 728.
113. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814 (1985) (“[P]erhaps under
narrowly confined circumstances, a detention for fingerprinting on less
than probable cause might comply with the Fourth Amendment.”).
114. Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 630 n.2 (2003).
115. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3905(A)(1) (2012) (requiring
“reasonable cause”); Colo. R. Crim. P. 41.1(c)(2) (2011) (requiring
“reasonable grounds, not amounting to probable cause”); Idaho Code
Ann. §19-625(1)(B) (2004) (requiring “[r]easonable grounds . . . which
may or may not amount to probable cause”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A273(2) (2012) (requiring “reasonable grounds to suspect”); VT. R.
Crim. P. 41.1(c)(2) (2012) (requiring “reasonable grounds to suspect”).
116. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) (extraction of blood);
see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 603–04 (1990) (voluntary,
incriminating “utterances” during field sobriety tests); United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973) (voice exemplar); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967) (in-person lineup); Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263, 266–67 (1967) (handwriting exemplar).
117. See Colo. R. Crim. P. 41.1(c)(2) (2011); Idaho Code Ann. § 19625(1)(B) (2004); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-273(2) (2012); VT. R.
Crim. P. 41.1(c)(2) (2012).
118. See State v. Jones, 49 P.3d 273, 280–81 (Ariz. 2002) (requiring probable
cause only when a “bodily invasion” is implicated).
119. See Williams v. Zavaras, No: 09–cv–02067–REB–CBS, 2011 WL
2432959, at *8–9 (D. Colo. Apr. 27, 2011) (upholding under the
deferential AEDPA standard as not “contrary to” or an “unreasonable
application” of “clearly established law”); Bousman v. Iowa Dist. Court
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one state court has invalidated a similar provision on Fourth
Amendment grounds, requiring a minimum of probable cause. 120 In
response, the state legislature amended the statute to make the
probable cause requirement explicit. 121 A federal version of the rule
was proposed but never adopted, in part because of concerns over its
constitutionality. 122 Another state court has held that while the
statute only requires a Terry-style “reasonable suspicion” standard, a
probable cause showing would be required for the most intrusive kinds
of samples, such as taking a blood sample. 123 This is in accord with
some Supreme Court case law stating that searches invading the body
are more intrusive and require heightened justification under the
Fourth Amendment. 124 Similarly, at least one scholar has argued for a
probable cause standard for such intrusive procedures (like sampling
blood, saliva, and urine), while allowing a reasonable suspicion
standard for samples of information normally visible to the public
(like fingerprinting, hair and voice samples, and physical
measurements) for which there is a lesser expectation of privacy. 125
Because such statutes authorize police to take a suspect from
where they find him and forcibly remove him to a police station or
hospital for procedures that will most likely take a few hours, they far
for Clinton Cnty, 630 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Iowa 2001) (upholding as
applied to saliva swab); People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18, 32 (Colo. 1981)
(en banc) (upholding Colo. R. Crim. P. 41.1, which permits detention
of criminal suspect on “reasonable grounds, not amounting to probable
cause” for purpose of obtaining “nontestimonial identification
evidence”). For further discussion, see Paul C. Giannelli, ABA
Standards on DNA Evidence: Nontestimonial Identification Orders, 24
Crim. Just. 24 (2009).
120. State v. Evans, 338 N.W.2d 788, 794 (Neb. 1983) (“We read the
identifying physical characteristics act to require a showing of probable
cause. . . . As so interpreted, the act is constitutional.”).
121. L.B. 361, 99th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2005) (adding subsection to Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 29-3303 requiring “probable cause to believe that the
person subject to the order has committed the offense”).
122. United States v. Holland, 552 F.2d 667, 673–74 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting
that in 1972 the Judicial Conference considered, but did not approve,
such an amendment), mandate aff’d, opinion withdrawn, 565 F.2d 383
(1978).
123. Jones, 49 P.3d at 281.
124. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) (requiring a case-bycase balancing approach for searches penetrating the skin in a case
involving surgery to remove a bullet from a suspect for ballistic
analysis).
125. Jennifer M. DiLalla, Beyond the Davis Dictum: Reforming
Nontestimonial Evidence Rules and Statutes, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 189,
225–26 (2008) (proposing a Model Rule distinguishing between intrusive
and nonintrusive searches).
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exceed the level of intrusion involved in a Terry stop. Thus, the
better reading of the Fourth Amendment case law, and the better
result overall, would be to require probable cause. That probable
cause requirement should apply regardless of how physically intrusive
or connected to a reasonable expectation of privacy the particular
sampling or test is. But the Supreme Court may ultimately decide to
the contrary—either by upholding such statutes’ application in all
cases or requiring probable cause based only on the physical intrusion
of the sampling and not on the deprivation of liberty involved in
forced removal to a police station or hospital.
Even if the Supreme Court upholds statutes requiring less than
probable cause, it would still not support 48-hour holds. Courts
upholding these statutes emphasize the limited nature of the
deprivation of liberty, the fact that the detention is a relatively brief
one, and the narrow purpose of obtaining discrete identifying
information. That is a far cry from allowing a person to be detained
for 20, 24, 48, or 72 hours while an open-ended investigation
continues.
Material Witness Statutes. Another potential exception to the rule
requiring probable cause to detain an individual involves holding an
individual as a “material witness.” 126 The federal material witness
statute authorizes the detention of an individual based on a judicial
finding that the individual’s testimony “is material in a criminal
proceeding” and that securing the witness’s presence via subpoena
“may become impracticable.” 127 Although the detainee would
normally be given the same freedoms as any defendant subject to bail
and pretrial release procedures, a material witness can be delayed “for
a reasonable period of time” to allow for the deposition of the witness
to be taken. 128
State material witness statutes follow a similar pattern.
Tennessee, for example, has such a statute, which also requires a
finding of material testimony. 129 Instead of requiring merely that the
126. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006) (“If it appears from an affidavit filed by a
party that the testimony of a person is material in a criminal
proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to
secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer may
order the arrest of the person and treat the person in accordance with
the provisions of section 3142 [regarding bail and pretrial release]. . . .
Release of a material witness may be delayed for a reasonable period of
time until the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-110 (2012) (“If it appears by affidavit
that the testimony of a person is material in any criminal proceeding
and if it is shown that the witness has refused or will refuse to respond
to process, the court may require the witness to give bail under § 40-11-
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subpoena process may be “impracticable,” the Tennessee statute
requires a showing that the witness “has refused or will refuse to
respond to process.” 130 Further, rather than ordering detention, the
judge is empowered to set bail to guarantee the witness’s later
appearance. Only after the person fails to give bail will the court be
empowered to detain the witness. 131 Tennessee courts have not yet
ruled on the constitutionality of material witness detentions.
Federal courts, however, have discussed, at least to a limited
extent, the constitutional standards applicable to the federal material
witness statute. The federal statute certainly provides “a significantly
lighter burden” than probable cause for the detention of an
individual. 132 The Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the
constitutionality of this lighter burden for detention. 133 But lower
courts have suggested that a warrant requirement of some type
applies. 134 Some courts have concluded that, in order to satisfy the
material witness statute’s elements, law enforcement must show
probable cause that the witness has material information and that a
subpoena will not suffice to secure the witness’s presence. Others have
declined to apply a probable cause standard, but have nonetheless
held that the general Fourth Amendment requirement of
“reasonableness” governs. 135 Concurring in the recent Supreme Court
case of Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, Justice Kennedy acknowledged the as-yet-

117 or § 40-11-122 for appearance as a witness, in an amount fixed by
the court.”).
130. Id. § 40-11-110(a).
131. Id. § 40-11-110(b).
132. Leading Cases, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 172, 228 (2011) (citing Joseph M.
Livermore, Carl P. Malmquist & Paul E. Meehl, On the Justifications
for Civil Commitment, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 75, 78 (1968)).
133. Adams v. Hanson, 656 F.3d 397, 407 n.6 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he
Supreme Court has never comprehensively addressed the statutory and
constitutional requirements for a valid material-witness warrant.”); see
also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (holding that
courts should not inquire into subjective intent behind a material
witness detention, and that defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity regarding material witness detentions at issue, but failing to
reach the general question of the constitutionality of material witness
detentions); id. at 2085–86 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The scope of the
statute’s lawful authorization is uncertain.”).
134. See, e.g., Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 942–43 (9th Cir. 1971).
135. Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 324–25 (3d Cir. 2011) (“So while the
Fourth Amendment applies here, the probable cause requirement
cannot. The Amendment provides only one standard that could govern
this situation: a seizure of an uncharged material witness is
constitutionally prohibited if it is ‘unreasonable.’ ”).
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unresolved choice between these two standards. 136 Although earlier
Sixth Circuit decisions required probable cause, the law in the Sixth
Circuit is not clear. 137
Regardless of the specific underlying constitutional standards,
material witness detention authority does not apply to the use of 48hour holds, nor does it provide authority for such holds under
anything less than probable cause. First, neither the law enforcement
agencies applying for such hold orders nor the courts granting them
rely on any material witness statute or any material witness
authority. For example, in the Tennessee appellate court opinions
holding 48-hour holds unconstitutional, no party raised material
witness authority as a justification for their use. 138 Nor was that raised
as a defense in the federal litigation challenging the practice in
Lauderdale County. 139 Court documents relating to the 48-hour holds
do not rely on this authority either. 140 Neither the judicial order forms
used in Shelby County nor 48-hour holds used in Lauderdale County
characterized the order as one relating to material witness
authority. 141
Second, at least for now, the law in the Sixth Circuit—and thus
throughout Tennessee, where the practice still continues and has in
recent years seen its broadest use—requires probable cause for
material witness detention orders. 142 Thus, for the time period in
which we know of the practice being in use in Tennessee, probable
cause would have been required regardless of whether the detentions
were purported to be applications of material witness authority.
136. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2086 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
137. See Hanson, 656 F.3d at 407 n.6 (acknowledging prior Sixth Circuit
“probable cause” decisions in Gerbitz and Stone, but relying on Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in al-Kidd to conclude that the issue was still an
open one).
138. See State v. Bishop, No. W2010-01207-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 938969
(Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 2012), appeal granted, Aug. 15, 2012; State
v. Rush, No. W2005-02809-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2884457, at *1 n.2
(Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 1, 2006) (“We know of no authority which
would permit the police to book a person into jail on a 48-hour
hold . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Ficklin, No.
W2000-01534-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1011470, at *7–8 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Aug. 27, 2001).
139. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, supra note 56.
140. See, e.g., Judicial Commissioners Report, supra note 57, at 7–8.
141. See 48-hour hold Form, supra note 73; Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, supra
note 56, at Exhibit 6 (Lauderdale County Sheriff’s Department
Detention Request Form).
142. White by Swafford v. Gerbitz, 892 F.2d 457, 460–61 (6th Cir. 1989);
Stone v. Holzberger, No. 92-3675, 1994 WL 175420, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan.
6, 1994).
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Most importantly, material witness detentions are not supposed
to be used to detain persons suspected of criminal activity, lest any
lower standards be used as an end-run around the normal protections
afforded the accused in our criminal justice system. 143 Because 48-hour
holds are routinely used to detain persons themselves suspected of a
crime who end up being charged with a crime, they are not properly
characterized as material witness detentions, and attempts to justify
them in that way would be improper.
“Immigration Holds.” A related creature is the “immigration
hold,” authorized by the federal immigration code. 144 An “immigration hold,” also called a “detainer,” applies to a noncitizen suspect
being held in federal, state, or local custody after arrest on narcotics
charges whose release may be imminent. 145 A federal immigration
officer may request such a person’s detention be prolonged, since
drug-related charges provide sufficient grounds for removability
(deportation). 146 If the custodial law enforcement agency complies, the
alien may be detained for up to 48 additional hours. 147 After 48 hours,
the alien must either be released, or be arrested by United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers for removal
proceedings. 148

143. See 27 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice
§ 646.23[3][b] (3d ed. 2012) (discussing standards for material custody
warrant applications and the failure of a challenge which alleged that
the “arresting authority had an improper motive”); Leading Cases,
supra note 132, at 227–28 (citing multiple commentators’ concerns over
the abuse of the practice).
144. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (2006).
145. The statute limits application of the detainer to controlled substance
suspects. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d). But see Comm. for Immigrant Rights v.
Cnty. of Sonoma, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1198–99 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(stating that the court must “defer to the agency’s reasonable
interpretation of the statute so long as the interpretation is consistent
with the purposes of the statute.”). That court ultimately found that
the statute “simply plac[es] special requirements on officials issuing
detainers for a violation of any law relating to controlled substances, not
as expressly limiting the issuance of immigration detainers solely to
individuals violating laws relating to controlled substances.” Id. at 1199.
146. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d); see also 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2011) (describing
detainers in general); Immigration & Nationality Act § 237(a)(2), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2006) (listing categories of criminal offenses for
which an alien may be deported).
147. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d).
148. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a). But see Ochoa v. Bass, 181 P.3d 727, 733 (Okla.
Crim. App. 2008) (ordering the release of two men after they spent
three months in prison pursuant to a detainer because ICE never
obtained custody).
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Unlike with a 48-hour hold, where (1) there is no statutory
authorization, (2) it applies to all types of defendants, and (3)
individualized suspicion is often lacking, an immigration hold is
expressly authorized by federal statute, applies only to narcotics
arrestees, 149 and is based on a preexisting conviction or probablecause-based detention concerning a narcotics charge that is clearly
grounds for deportation. 150 For that reason, immigration holds seem
materially distinct from 48-hour holds. The existence of immigration
holds (assuming their constitutionality) does not necessarily
constitute support for the constitutionality of the typical “48-hour
hold” practice.
Regardless of whether immigration holds are in fact distinct from
48-hour holds, the question naturally arises as to whether the former
are constitutional. Noncitizens within the United States have due
process protections against unreasonable seizure. 151 Therefore, one
might argue that immigration holds violate the noncitizen suspect’s
constitutional rights by improperly extending their detention. But the
Supreme Court has already held that noncitizens can be detained
without bail during a removal proceeding. 152 This is so because
Congress has an interest in assuring that noncitizens will comply with
the requirements of the removal proceedings and that they will
actually show up at their hearing. 153 As long as the “immigration
149. But see Christopher N. Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive’s
Authority to Issue Immigration Detainers, 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev.
164, 179 (2008) (explaining that in practice, ICE uses the detainer
“indiscriminately, regardless of the criminal charges an alien is facing”).
Such expanded use of the immigration hold would be outside the
statutory authority and thus illegal.
150. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d); 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a). The federal statute refers to
federal immigration officers’ “reason to believe” that the suspect is
present in the United States illegally, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d), which might
suggest that this prolonged detention (up to 48 hours) is improperly
taking place based on a Terry-style “reasonable suspicion” standard.
But since the detainer is used only where the suspect is already being
held (presumably constitutionally) on deportable charges, it
contemplates a situation where there has already been at least a
probable cause determination, or possibly an actual conviction, prior to
ICE’s involvement.
An interesting question might arise as to situations where ICE issues the
detainer request during the first 48 hours after a warrantless arrest and
prior to any probable cause determination. In that situation, the suspect
could theoretically be held for more than 48 hours (somewhere between
48 and 96 hours) without a probable cause determination. There are no
reported cases of this precise situation, which would require remarkably
speedy coordination between ICE and the other law enforcement agency.
151. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
152. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003).
153. Id. at 528.
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hold” suspect’s initial detention by the other law enforcement agency
for a (deportation-eligible) narcotics charge was based on probable
cause, there is necessarily probable cause to believe the suspect is
deportable. Thus, the extended detention for the additional 48 hours
is more in the nature of being denied bail and being detained as a
flight risk—something that the Court has already approved.
However, there is evidence to suggest that ICE often exceeds the
authority granted by Congress and uses the detainer procedure
illegally. 154 The two most common abuses occur when ICE issues
detainers without an initiating request from the local law enforcement
officials, and when ICE is lodging detainers upon individuals who
have not been arrested for controlled substance offences. 155 Thus,
while the detainer procedure might not fail the constitutional test for
the same reasons the “48-hour hold” does, the procedure seems to be
abused, imposing unconstitutional restraints upon noncitizens.
2.

Forty-Eight-Hour Holds’ Violation of the Requirement

As practiced, 48-hour holds run contrary to the basic requirement
of probable cause before a person can be arrested. Although some
defenders of the practice have claimed that 48-hour hold orders are
issued only upon probable cause 156—for example, the forms used in
Shelby County, Tennessee, contain a boilerplate recitation of
“probable cause” being found 157—there is good reason to believe that
48-hour holds, as practiced in Tennessee, have not, in fact, required
probable cause.
First, official statements from the courts authorizing 48-hour
holds in Shelby County acknowledge as much. One example is the
2012 report submitted by the Shelby County General Sessions Court
to the Shelby County Commission, which states that “[t]he 48 [hour]
hold does not quite have the probable cause needed for charging as in
an Affidavit of Complaint.” 158 Another example is a memorandum
154. Lasch, supra note 149, at 176–77 (noting that the ICE can detain any
individual subject to exclusion or deportation proceedings).
155. Id.
156. See Shelby County Commission Transcript, supra note 17, at 4, 6–7
(testimony of Shelby County General Sessions Court Judge Loyce
Lambert Ryan); Lawrence Buser, Daniel Connolly & Kevin McKenzie,
Officials Suspend 48-Hour Holds, Com. Appeal (Memphis), Mar. 31,
2012, at A1 (reporting comments of Shelby County District Attorney
Amy Weirich).
157. See 48-hour hold Form, supra note 73 (sample form used in Shelby
County General Sessions Court).
158. Judicial Commissioners Report, supra note 57, at 7; see also Shelby
County Commission Transcript, supra note 17, at 3–4 (General Sessions
Court Judge Ryan acknowledging this to be stated in the Judicial
Commissioners Report).
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from the Judicial Commissioners within that court, who actually issue
the 48-hour hold orders. 159 This memorandum recited a standard of
“reasonably, articulable [sic] suspicion” that “an offense has
occurred.” 160 This is clearly the “reasonable suspicion” standard of
Terry v. Ohio—a standard which is lower than that of probable
cause, 161 and undoubtedly insufficient to justify an arrest. 162
Second, as a federal district court has found, in Lauderdale
County, the policy itself “specifically authorized law enforcement
officials to detain individuals in the Lauderdale County Jail for up to
48 hours, for the purpose of conducting further investigation, without
probable cause to believe that the individuals being detained had
committed an offense.” 163 In a resulting federal civil rights action,
Lauderdale County admitted that its 48-hour hold policy authorized
detention on less than probable cause, and the court thus found that
Lauderdale’s policy violated the Constitution. 164 In proceedings related
to this federal lawsuit, the Lauderdale County Sheriff admitted under
oath that, until 2010, the Lauderdale policy had allowed for 48-hour
detentions without charge or probable cause. 165
Third, law enforcement agents in Shelby County made similar
admissions under oath in other cases, including Bishop. 166 The appellate
court in that case found that, despite boilerplate recitations that the
defendant was being held “on probable cause,” the record failed to
establish that the magistrate’s signing off on the 48-hour hold form was
in fact “a true judicial determination of probable cause.” 167
159. Potter Memorandum, supra note 59.
160. Id.
161. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that the “reasonable
suspicion” standard is lower than probable cause).
162. Id. at 26–27.
163. Rhodes v. Lauderdale Cnty., No. 2:10-cv-02068-JPM-dkv, 2012 WL
4434722, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 24, 2012). See also Plaintiffs’
Memorandum, supra note 56, at Exhibit 5 (November 1998 Lauderdale
County Sheriff’s Department memorandum authorizing 48-hour holds
“on investigation” without charge).
164. Rhodes, 2012 WL 4434722, at *2 (“[Lauderdale County] admitted that
the [defendants] were detained without probable cause because, due to
an erroneous reading of County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44
(1991), Lauderdale County law enforcement officials believed that they
had 48 hours to establish probable cause and file charges against
suspects.”).
165. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, supra note 56, at 4–5 (citing deposition
testimony of Lauderdale County Sheriff Steve Sanders).
166. State v. Bishop, No. W2010–01207–CCA–R3–CD. 2012 WL 938969, at
*7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 2012), appeal granted, Aug. 15, 2012.
167. Id. at *6 n.1, *14.

843

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3 ·2013
The Remarkably Resilient, Constitutionally Dubious 48-Hour Hold

Fourth, individual examples of 48-hour hold orders in other cases
from Shelby County, Tennessee reflect instances where such orders
were issued based on recitations of facts supporting less than probable
cause. The forms used in such orders contain a blank for law
enforcement to recite the “reason(s) for requesting detention”; this is
the only place on the form where any basis for the detention is
provided. 168 In a number of instances, that part of the form contained
nothing more than mere conclusory assertions of suspected criminal
activity. In one case, for example, the form merely recited that a
named victim was assaulted at a particular time and place by the
defendant, without reciting any basis for believing the defendant was
the culprit. It then simply adds that “[a]dditional time is needed to
review the sexual assault kit, review the evidence, conduct interviews
and show photo line ups.” 169 In another, the form merely stated that
the defendant “has been implicated as being responsible” for an
identified homicide and adds that “[a] ‘48 Hour Hold’ is hereby
requested for investigation by the MPD Homicide Bureau.” 170 In both
cases, the form continues that “[t]he Court has reviewed the above
listed facts” and “has determined there is probable cause.” These
conclusory allegations are textbook examples of the kinds of “bare
bones” affidavits that the Supreme Court has held do not provide
probable cause. 171
The Bishop case, which finally triggered a suspension of the holds
in Shelby County, provides another good example. In that case, the
48-hour hold form recites simply that the victim was shot and that
“[d]uring the investigation the defendant was named as the
shooter.” 172 Here, at least, law enforcement expressly asserted that
there was evidence linking the defendant to the crime, which is more
than the two instances discussed above. But no information was
provided about who named the defendant, let alone his or her basis of

168. See, e.g., Order Granting Detention for Probable Cause, In re Michael
Edwards, Booking No. 10126758 (Gen. Sessions Court, Shelby Cnty.,
Tenn., July 5, 2010) (on file with author).
169. Id.
170. See Order Granting Detention for Probable Cause, In re Tracy L.
Campbell, Booking No. 09203972 (Gen. Sessions Court, Shelby Cnty.,
Tenn., May 9, 2009) (on file with author).
171. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983) (citing Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108, 115–16 (1964); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41,
46–47 (1933)).
172. See Order Granting Detention for Probable Cause, In re Courtney
Bishop, Booking No. 08128890 (Gen. Sessions Court, Shelby Cnty.,
Tenn., Aug. 22, 2008) (on file with author).
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knowledge or reliability. 173 It is therefore difficult to say that a
showing of probable cause was made.
That is not to say that there have not been instances, even many
instances, in which a 48-hour hold was obtained where there was
indeed probable cause to suspect the detainee was guilty of the
particular crime referenced in the 48-hour hold order. But as practiced
in Tennessee, the procedure has allowed numerous, if not routine,
non-Terry detentions without probable cause.
3.

Defenses of the Departure from the Requirement

Some defenders of the practice have suggested probable cause to
hold a suspect for 48 hours for investigation is different from, and less
demanding than, probable cause to “get charged.” 174 Or, stated
differently, that a lower level of probable cause than the normal level
needed for an arrest would apply because a 48-hour hold is “less than
an arrest.” 175 Indeed, the Shelby County Judicial Commissioners
Report implies this kind of regime of multiple layers of probable cause
when it reports that the hold “does not quite have the probable cause
needed for charging” 176—suggesting, perhaps, that there is a lower
level of probable cause adequate for the more limited detention
involved in 48-hour holds. This suggestion reflects a more general
misunderstanding of the requirement of probable cause among local
law enforcement officers and judges.
This defense of 48-hour holds will not hold (so to speak). There is
only one level of “probable cause.” It is either present or it is not. If
present, the proper course is to arrest and charge the defendant. If it
is not present, the defendant may not be brought into custody, and

173. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 237–38 (requiring analysis of the “veracity” and
“basis of knowledge” of an unnamed source before ruling on probable
cause). Indeed, in Tennessee, the corroboration needed for unnamed
sources in this situation is even greater. The Tennessee Supreme Court
has retained the prior, stricter Aguilar-Spinelli test requiring separate
minimum showings of the “basis of knowledge” prong and the “veracity”
prong; a slight insufficiency of either is fatal to the probable cause
showing. State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 431–36 (Tenn. 1989) (citing
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 412–13 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964)). By contrast, the United States Supreme
Court in Gates abandoned the stricter Aguilar-Spinelli two-prong test
for a more flexible “totality of the circumstances” approach: a slidingscale analysis in which strength in one prong can overcome weakness in
another. Gates, 462 U.S. at 237–39.
174. State v. Bishop, No. W2010–01207–CCA–R3–CD, 2012 WL 938969, at
*7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 2012) (characterizing the prosecution’s
assertion in this way), appeal granted, Aug. 15, 2012.
175. Id.
176. Judicial Commissioners Report, supra note 57, at 7–8.
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may not be detained at all (except for a brief, on-the-spot Terry stop
based on “reasonable suspicion”).
In Lauderdale County, the policy expressly authorized 48-hour
detentions when there was less than probable cause. 177 In Shelby
County, official reports acknowledged that they were used with less
than probable cause. 178 In Tipton County, a lack of documentation on
the practice makes it hard to know how officials characterized the
practice, but there certainly appears to be no documentation claiming
any level of probable cause. Thus, in Tennessee, there has been an
acknowledged, widespread procedure that, for years, systematically
violated the Fourth Amendment.
B.

Origins of the Practice

How did this problematic procedure come to be? It appears that
it developed largely based on a misunderstanding of Supreme Court
case law on detention requirements. 179
In 1975, the Supreme Court held that after a warrantless arrest, a
defendant is entitled to a “prompt[ ]” determination of probable cause
by a judicial officer in order for any “extended restraint of liberty” to
continue. 180 This led to the use of so-called “Gerstein hearings” after
warrantless arrests. Such hearings can be ex parte, and use hearsay
evidence; but a judicial officer, independent of the prosecution and
law enforcement, must hear the evidence and make an official finding
of probable cause. 181 If the magistrate fails to find probable cause, the
defendant must be released. 182 If the arrest is pursuant to an arrest
warrant, no Gerstein hearing is necessary: the warrant itself
constitutes a prior finding of probable cause by a magistrate. 183 The
Gerstein Court provided no guidance as to how “promptly” after the
warrantless arrest the Gerstein hearing must be.

177. Rhodes v. Lauderdale Cnty., No. 2:10-cv-02068-JPM-dkv, 2012 WL
4434722, at *1–2 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 24, 2012).
178. Judicial Commissioners Report, supra note 57, at
Memorandum, supra note 59, at 1.

7–8; Potter

179. Rhodes, 2012 WL 4434722, at *2 (relating that Lauderdale County,
Tennessee, defendants admitted 48-hour hold policy based on erroneous
reading of McLaughlin); Potter Memorandum, supra note 59, at 1 (“The
48 Hour Hold Order form was in response to U.S. Supreme Court cases
of Gerstein v. Pugh and County of Riverside v. McLaughlin . . . .”).
180. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 125 (1975).
181. Id. at 114, 120.
182. Id. at 114–16 (analogizing modern practice with common law practice,
which required release from custody if no probable cause existed).
183. E.g., Garcia v. City of Chicago, 24 F.3d 966, 973 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994)
(citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120).
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The Court provided that guidance sixteen years later in County of
Riverside v. McLaughlin. 184 The Court held that a Gerstein hearing
held within 48 hours of arrest enjoys a presumption of
constitutionality; after 48 hours, the burden shifts to the prosecution
to justify the delay by showing “a bona fide emergency or other
extraordinary circumstance.” 185 Crucially, even if the judicial
determination of probable cause takes place within 48 hours, a
defendant can still establish a violation if she can prove that the
hearing was delayed unreasonably. 186
From McLaughlin came a general understanding of a “48-hour
rule” regarding judicial determinations of probable cause. But
McLaughlin did not alter the general requirement that arrests must be
supported by probable cause. It simply prescribed how quickly a
judicial officer must ratify the police’s assertion (via a warrantless
arrest) that probable cause did indeed exist at the time of arrest.
State and local jurisdictions applied this requirement to their own
rules and procedures as faithfully as they could. Again, Tennessee
provides a good example. The Tennessee Supreme Court applied the
McLaughlin rule to Tennessee cases in State v. Huddleston. 187 In
Huddleston, the Court dealt with a warrantless arrest followed by a
period of more than seventy-two hours before the defendant was
brought before a magistrate for a probable cause determination.188
The court held that such unreasonable delay would trigger application
of the “exclusionary rule,” and could thus lead to suppression of
statements obtained as a product of the illegal detention. 189 The court
adopted and applied the four-part test of Brown v. Illinois 190 for
determining when an admission would be considered “fruit of the
poisonous tree” of the illegal detention and thus suppressed.191
184. Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
185. Id. at 57.
186. Id. at 56. Where the hearing is delayed for a minimum of 48 hours so
that the police can continue their investigation before they decide how
to charge, this would seem to be an “unreasonable” delay. See infra
Part II.C.
187. State v. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d 666 (Tenn. 1996).
188. Id. at 668.
189. Id. at 676.
190. The Brown test considers: (1) the presence or absence of a Miranda
warning, (2) “[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession,”
(3) “the presence of intervening circumstances,” and (4) “the purpose
and flagrancy of the official conduct.” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,
603–04 (1975).
191. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d at 674–75 (applying the Brown test); see also
Brown, 422 U.S. at 599 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 487–88 (1963)).
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Significantly, the Tennessee Supreme Court made clear that it would
hold as invalid all arrests based on anything less than probable cause,
and that one could not justify a delay in detention “for the purpose of
gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest.” 192
In some Tennessee jurisdictions, this “48-hour rule” somehow
morphed into an (incorrect) understanding that police could hold
someone for up to 48 hours, even if they did not have probable cause.
Concurrent with this misunderstanding was the related misapprehension that a lower quantum of evidence was necessary to hold
someone than to charge them as well as the mistaken belief that one
could routinely arrest persons without charge for up to 48 hours. At
least as far back as the 1990s, some jurisdictions were using a
precursor to the 48-hour hold procedure known as placing a defendant
“on the hook.” 193 For example, the Memphis Police Department put
roughly 10 percent of all arrestees “on the hook” without charging
them. 194 The percentage was even greater for felony arrests. 195 This
practice often meant detention of those suspects without charge for
up to seventy-two hours without a probable cause review by a
magistrate. 196 One media study showed that up to 40 percent of
people held “on the hook” were eventually released without charge. 197
Even back at that time, the procedure was criticized as improper
detention. 198 The local defense bar protested that the “on the hook”
practice amounted to unlawful investigative detentions, inasmuch as
people were being arrested without charge or in many cases even
probable cause. 199
In 1999, the Memphis/Shelby County Crime Commission issued a
report criticizing the practice in Shelby County and calling for its
192. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d at 676 (citing Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991)).
193. Conley, On the Hook, supra note 64; Conley, Study Hits, supra note 37.
194. Conley, On the Hook, supra note 64 (reviewing 500 arrest records over a
three-day period and finding 46 designated as “on the hook”).
195. Chris Conley, County Jail to Refuse Detainees Not Charged, Com.
Appeal (Memphis), Nov. 20, 2000, at A1 [hereinafter Conley, Not
Charged] (reporting that until 1998, Memphis police put most felony
prisoners “on the hook”).
196. Id.
197. Id. (reviewing forty-six “on the hook” arrests over a sample three-day
period and finding nineteen resulting in release without charges).
198. See Editorial, Do It Right, Com. Appeal (Memphis), Feb. 5, 1999, at
A6 (calling for an end to this practice); Editorial, The Hook: Police
Policy Toward Suspects Merits Review, Com. Appeal (Memphis), Nov.
4, 1998, at A10 (advocating for a critical evaluation of the practice).
199. Do It Right, supra note 198 (relating comments by, among others,
attorney Robert Hutton).
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abolition.200 It recommended such reforms as mobile booking, 24-hour
access to magistrates to speed the booking process, and the elimination
of the potential abuse represented by “on the hook” arrests.201
Shelby County responded by adding “Judicial Commissioners” to
its General Sessions Court system. These commissioners were tasked
with, among other things, providing timely probable cause determinations to persons arrested without a warrant.202 But this did not
end the practice of arresting suspected felons without charge and
holding them preliminarily for up to 48 hours before charging them.203
Indeed, the Memphis Police Department did not substantially reduce
the practice until the 2000 decision by the Shelby County Sheriff’s
Department to stop accepting detainees unless they were charged.204
The policy change was motivated by overcrowding concerns, since the
local jail was the subject of then-pending federal litigation charging jail
overcrowding. 205 Even then, law enforcement continued the practice for
the more serious felony suspects. 206 The Sheriff Department’s
overcrowding-motivated policy change thus reduced the scope of the
practice in that county but did not end it completely.
The Tennessee Criminal Court of Appeals added its own criticism
of the practice in 2001. In State v. Ficklin, that court reversed a
conviction and remanded for new trial based in part on the improper
seizure of the defendant pursuant to this policy. 207 The defendant in
that case had been “booked for further investigation,” 208 but without
probable cause. 209 Referring to this practice, the court stated that
“[t]he officers apparently, and mistakenly, believed it was permissible
to take a person into custody without probable cause for questioning
since there is no ‘arrest.’ ” 210 The court held this unconstitutional,
both because the defendant was seized without probable cause and
because the defendant was detained “in order for the authorities to
endeavor to establish probable cause for an arrest.” 211
200. Conley, Study Hits, supra note 37.
201. Id.
202. Conley, Not Charged, supra note 195.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. State v. Ficklin, No. W2000-01534-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1011470, at
*10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 27, 2001).
208. Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
209. Id. at *8.
210. Id. at *7.
211. Id. at *9.
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Five years later, the same court again criticized this practice,
specifically noting with disapproval that it was part of a regular
policy. The court in State v. Rush noted that it was aware of no
authority “which would permit the police to book a person ‘into jail
on a 48-hour hold,’ or . . . ‘on the hook,’ without preferring any
criminal charges in order that the police could complete their
investigation.” 212 It added that “[t]his Memphis Police Department
practice has been routinely condemned as it constitutes an unlawful
detention and subjects any evidence obtained during this period of
detention to suppression.” 213
Although the court opinions criticized the practice as it occurred
in Shelby County, officials were also conducting it in other Tennessee
counties, including Tipton County 214 and Lauderdale County, 215 and,
far more rarely, in Warren and Van Buren counties. 216 In 2010,
private plaintiffs filed a civil rights lawsuit against Lauderdale County
seeking to enjoin the practice. 217 A federal district court held that the
practice violated the Constitution and permanently enjoined it. 218
Despite all this, the practice continued in other counties, including
Shelby and Tipton.
Six years after Rush, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
criticized the practice yet again in Bishop. Citing Rush and Ficklin,
the Bishop court noted that the continued practice was “troubling”
because “this court has repeatedly noted the illegality of the
procedure and warned the Memphis Police Department specifically
against its use.” 219 The court criticized the Memphis Police
Department for regularly using this practice to the point that special
forms had been generated for it. 220 It also criticized the magistrate
212. State v. Rush, No. W2005-02809-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2884457, at *1
n.2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 11, 2006).
213. Id. (citing Ficklin, 2001 WL 1011470).
214. Tipton County List of Arrests, supra note 27.
215. Consent Order Certifying Class Action and Granting Preliminary
Injunctive Relief at 1, Rhodes v. Lauderdale Cnty., No. 2:10-cv-02068JPM-dkv (W.D. Tenn. July 2, 2010), ECF No. 18.
216. Thomas Miner, an Assistant District Attorney for Tennessee’s 31st
Judicial District, admitted that the practice is used in Warren and Van
Buren counties, but only about once per year. Telephone Interview by
Razvan Axente with Thomas J. Miner, Assistant Dist. Att’y, 31st Jud.
Dist. (June 20, 2012).
217. Lauderdale Contempt Order, supra note 63, at 2.
218. See id. at 3–4 (reviewing the district court’s entry of a preliminary
injunction and later grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs).
219. State v. Bishop, No. W2010-01207-CAA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 938969, at *7
(Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 2012), appeal granted, Aug. 15, 2012.
220. Id.
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reviewing the 48-hour hold order form for giving “an air of legitimacy
to the procedure.” 221 The court noted disapprovingly that the
prosecutor had attempted to distinguish between a level of probable
cause sufficient to hold a suspect and the (presumably higher) level of
probable cause needed to charge him. 222
The Bishop opinion was the most extensive, most emphatic
condemnation of 48-hour holds in Tennessee. At one point in the
opinion, the court stated that “[t]he ‘48-hour hold’ does not exist in
our constitutional pantheon of acceptable practices. The 48-hour hold
procedure as described and utilized in this case is patently
unconstitutional and subjects any evidence acquired to suppression.” 223
The Bishop opinion led to another round of critical media stories
and official condemnations. 224 It was only after this lengthy history of
media and court criticism that the practice was suspended in Shelby
County. 225

III. Arrests Without Charge
As noted above, defenders of the practice have insisted that 48hour detentions are indeed based upon probable cause. And, going
forward, one could conceive of reforming the practice to allow only
those 48-hour holds that are based on true probable cause. But this
change, while ameliorative, would still not suffice to render the
practice acceptable, for a number of reasons.
For one thing, 48-hour holds, by their nature, contemplate
arresting people without charge. A fundamental principle of law is
that for police to arrest a suspect, they must charge him with a crime.
A.

Generally

Justice Clarence Thomas made this point clear in a recent
dissenting opinion. Justice Thomas discussed the constitutional
principles underlying the right to counsel, drawing from basic principles
of law at the time of the Framers and looking to Blackstone as “the
preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation.” 226 He
noted with approval Blackstone’s statement that “a person could not
be arrested and detained without a ‘charge’ or ‘accusation,’ i.e., an
allegation, supported by probable cause, that the person had committed
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at *8 (emphasis added).
224. Connolly, supra note 19.
225. Buser, Connolly & McKenzie, supra note 156.
226. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 219 (2008) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999)).
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a crime.” 227 He was careful to distinguish between this sense of
“charge”—the crime identified by the arresting officer at the point of
arrest—and a “formal charge,” which is the filing by the prosecutor of
an indictment, presentment, or information.228 While the former must
accompany an arrest, only the latter will trigger the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel under federal law. 229
The requirement that a charge accompany an arrest—or,
conversely, the prohibition on arresting people without charge—is so
fundamental that it is taken for granted, and there are not many
cases making this point explicit. It is generally contemplated that a
charge accompanies an arrest. 230 It is, literally, hornbook law. 231
Federal courts have held that police are under a general obligation to
inform arrestees of the charges against them at the time of arrest,
although exigent circumstances like violent resistance or hot pursuit
may excuse police from this requirement. 232
The Supreme Court has stated that while it is “good police
practice to inform a person of the reason for his arrest at the time he
is taken into custody, we have never held that to be constitutionally
required.” 233 But even contemplating that police may omit informing
the suspect of the charge at the point of arrest, the Court went on, a
suspect should not “be left to wonder for long,” because warrantless
arrestees, under McLaughlin, must be “promptly” brought before a
227. Id. at 220 (citing 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *289–300).
228. Id. at 220–21.
229. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431 (1986) (stating that “the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel does not attach until after the initiation of
formal charges,” and distinguishing between indictment, which qualifies,
and mere custodial arrest, which does not); see also Rothgery, 554 U.S. at
220–21 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The rule in Tennessee differs. Under
Tennessee law, even a simple arrest, if pursuant to a warrant, will suffice
to trigger the protections guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. State v. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Tenn. 1996).
230. See Yale Kamisar et al., Modern Criminal Procedure: Cases,
Comments, Questions 8 (12th ed. 2008) (identifying the traditional
definition of “arrest” as “the taking of a suspect into custody for the
purpose of charging him with a crime”) (emphasis added); Wayne R.
LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure 9 (5th ed. 2009) (describing
“the initial decision to charge” as accompanying warrantless arrests in
the vast majority of felony cases).
231. See, e.g., LaFave et al., supra note 230.
232. See, e.g., Schindelar v. Michaud, 411 F.2d 80, 83 (10th Cir. 1969)
(excusing officer for not informing arrestee of charges after arrestee
attacked the officer and destroyed his patrol car’s windshield);
Montgomery v. United States, 403 F.2d 605, 610 (8th Cir. 1968)
(declining to require officers to inform arrestee of charges when the
arrest is made during the commission of a crime).
233. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 155 (2004) (emphasis added).
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magistrate. 234 Since under McLaughlin this must normally occur
within 48 hours, and more quickly if feasible, a blanket policy of
waiting at least 48 hours before informing warrantless arrestees of the
charge is inconsistent with Supreme Court doctrine.
Thus, the relatively narrow exceptions to the normal expectation
that police inform arrestees of the charges on the scene do not
regularly excuse police from charging a defendant upon arrival at the
police station, or at least with reasonable promptness thereafter. Nor
do they authorize law enforcement to hold a suspect for 48 hours
without charge. Indeed, federal courts have criticized other countries
for their rules allowing detention of persons for days without charge.235
The 48-hour hold procedure runs directly contrary to this
principle. By design, the procedure involves arresting a person
without charge and then detaining them for 48 hours without
charge. 236 In Willis v. Bell, the Northern District of Illinois explained
that even where probable cause exists, a policy of deliberately holding
persons beyond the earliest practicable time where a probable cause
hearing could be held was unconstitutional. 237 And even though there
may be no “iron-clad rule” that warrantless arrestees be charged with
234. Id. at 155 n.3 (quoting Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44,
53 (1991)).
235. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15 (1965) (Cuba); Amenu v. Holder, 434
Fed. App’x 276, 280 (4th Cir. 2011) (Ethiopia); Haile v. Holder, 658
F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2011) (Eritrea).
236. See Judicial Commissioners Report, supra note 57, at 5, 7
(acknowledging that the holds are used in Shelby County when there is
insufficient probable cause to charge a suspect with an affidavit of
complaint); Lauderdale Contempt Order, supra note 63, at 2 (indicating
that the Lauderdale County 48-hour hold policy “specifically authorized
law enforcement law enforcement officials to detain individuals . . . for
up to 48 hours, for the purpose of conducting further investigation,
without probable cause to believe that the [detained] individual . . . had
committed an offense”); State v. Bishop, No. W2010–01207–CCA–R3–
CD, 2012 WL 938969, at *4–7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 2012) (citing
police testimony on use of a 48-hour hold, which officers mistakenly
believed was “constitutionally permissible” because “the defendant was
not yet charged with any crime”), appeal granted, Aug. 15, 2012; cf.
State v. Ficklin, No. W2000-01534-CCA-R3CCAR3-CD, 2001 WL
1011470, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 27, 2001) (describing officers’
mistaken belief that 48-hour hold without probable cause was acceptable
“since there [was] no ‘arrest’ ”).
237. Willis v. Bell, 726 F. Supp. 1118, 1125, 1127 n.20 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(calling the prosecution’s argument that probable cause was present
“beside the point” and a “lame attempt” at defending the policy); see
also Robinson v. City of Chicago, 638 F. Supp. 186, 192–93 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (“However, that the original arrest was with probable cause does
not satisfy the Constitutional requirement of judicial determination of
probable cause prior to extended detention.” (citing Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103, 117–19 (1975))).
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a crime “forthwith,” 238 the Constitution forbids a detention where
“there was never any interest in presenting [the suspect] to a
judge.” 239 Similarly, a detention is “not permissible” where “the sole
purpose of the pick-up [is] to hold [the suspect] until she either
cooperate[s] or [the statutory period] expire[s].” 240
Since every variety of “hold” procedure described above in Part II
contemplates that the suspect be held until either charged or released,
they all violate this fundamental rule against holding a person for
long periods of time without any charge. In Tennessee, for example,
the actual documents used to process and memorialize such holds
make clear the “investigative detention” purposes underlying them.
The form used in Shelby County, Tennessee, for granting a 48-hour
hold provides that the defendant “be held in the Shelby County Jail
pending the presentment of a formal charging instrument to the
appropriate magistrate.” 241 The form used in Lauderdale County
includes separate blanks for either listing a charge or indicating that
the person was being held for investigation on a particular charge. 242
When a 48-hour hold is used, the former blanks are crossed out, and
the latter blanks filled in, highlighting that the 48-hour hold is an
alternative to charging. 243 The arrest ledger in Tipton County has a
column for the charge for which the person has been detained. In
most cases, a particular crime is listed; for the 48-hour holds, that
column entry simply reads “Hold for Investigation,” also indicating a
lack of a charge. 244
The arrest of a person without charge for 48 hours also violates
the federal rules of criminal procedure and many state rules of
criminal procedure. The federal rule requires that persons arrested
238. United States v. Roberts, 928 F. Supp. 910, 915 (W.D. Mo. 1996)
(quoting John Scurlock, Arrest in Missouri, 29 UMKC L. Rev. 117,
128 (1961)).
239. Id. (characterizing officers’ intent in the case at bar).
240. Id.
241. See 48-hour hold Form, supra note 73.
242. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, supra note 56, at Exhibit 6 (Lauderdale
County Sheriff’s Department Detention Request Form).
243. Id.
244. Tipton County List of Arrests, supra note 27; see also State v. Bishop,
No. W2010–01207–CCA–R3–CD, 2012 WL 938969, at *4–5 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Mar. 14, 2012) (citing testimony from numerous police
officers that (1) the 48-hour hold is used “until we can . . . come up
with the appropriate charges” or until the defendant is “officially
charged out,” and (2) the affidavit accompanying the application for a
48-hour hold “states that [the suspect is not] being . . . charged, but
[that] he is being placed on a forty-eight-hour hold”), appeal granted,
Aug. 15, 2012.
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without warrant be brought before the court “without unnecessary
delay.” 245 Many states have rules of criminal procedure modeled on
this rule. In Missouri, for example, a federal court found Missouri’s
“20-hour hold” procedure, 246 when used as an “investigative tool,”
violated not only the Constitution, but, where federal officers are
involved, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), which requires
warrantless arrestees to be brought “promptly” before a magistrate.247
A federal court in Illinois held that even if a detention-without-charge
policy can be implemented in compliance with relevant federal and
Illinois rules of criminal procedure, such compliance would not save
the policy from constitutional infirmity. 248
Tennessee’s own Rule 5(a) is fairly typical. It applies to “[a]ny
person arrested,” and provides that such person “shall be taken without
unnecessary delay before the nearest appropriate magistrate.” 249 Once
the arrestee is brought before the magistrate, an affidavit of
complaint—a charging instrument—must be filed “promptly.”250
Case law provides limited guidance on how much of a lag
between being arrested and being brought before a magistrate
constitutes “unnecessary delay” for purposes of Rule 5(a), suggesting
that a delay of some number of hours would satisfy the
requirement, 251 but a delay of seventy-two hours would violate it. 252
There is not much guidance on what constitutes “promptly” filing a
charging instrument after being brought before the magistrate.
Nonetheless, the clear import of Rule 5(a) is that arrestees must be
charged as speedily as possible. A delay of 48 hours, due not to
245. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a).
246. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 544.170 (2011).
247. United States v. Roberts, 928 F. Supp. 910, 915, 937 (W.D. Mo. 1996).
248. Robinson v. City of Chicago, 638 F. Supp. 186, 192 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(finding Illinois policy unconstitutional on its face).
249. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 5(a)(1). The only exception is where the arrestee
has already been charged by the prosecutor through indictment or
presentment. Id.
250. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 5(a)(2).
251. See State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d 600, 622, 626 (Tenn. 2004) (affirming
lower court’s ruling that delay of twelve to thirteen hours was not
“unnecessary delay” under the circumstances); State v. Johnson, 980
S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (finding that being brought
before magistrate within one day satisfied the Rule); State v. Haynes,
720 S.W.2d 76, 83 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986) (holding that where
defendant alleged delay of over nine hours, but record revealed only a
one-hour delay, arrest did not violate the Rule).
252. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 16 S.W.3d 762, 764 (Tenn. 2000) (finding
delay of seventy-two hours violated the Rule); State v. Huddleston, 924
S.W.2d 666, 670–71 (Tenn. 1996) (same).
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pragmatic circumstances but by design as part of a deliberate policy
not provided for by the Rules of Criminal Procedure, seems to
violate this Rule, as well as the Constitution.
To be sure, Tennessee law does not provide, as a remedy for
violations of this rule, for the automatic suppression of any resulting
statements obtained. Such statements are still admissible as long as
they were not obtained under circumstances suggesting a violation of
the voluntariness requirement of the Due Process Clause. 253 But there
are other potential remedies for violations of the Fourth Amendment
besides evidence exclusion, including civil tort liability. 254
B.

Reasons for Desiring a Charge-Free Alternative

Indeed, for those 48-hour hold cases in the past with probable
cause, or those cases going forward where probable cause exists, the
pertinent question is, why not simply charge the defendant at the
point of arrest? Why do certain law enforcement agencies prefer the
charge-free 48-hour hold procedure?
Various answers are provided by law enforcement, courts, and
skeptical defense lawyers. Some law enforcement officials cite
convenience. They wish to make sure they have time to ascertain
every potential charge that they can bring against a defendant.
Officers wish to avoid charging the defendant on Crime X initially,
only to find out after further investigation that Charge Y should be
brought, either in addition to or instead of the initial charge.
Similarly, if they charge Crime X and the defendant is released on
bail, once the police later realize that other charges can be brought,
they must go find the defendant again and bring him back in for the
subsequent charges. 255 Others state generally that the holds provide
the time for law enforcement to review surveillance videos, obtain
statements from victims or witnesses in the hospital, or even check
exculpatory information. 256 One judge overseeing such detentions adds
that it may afford time for “an ongoing investigation to substantiate
the allegations that were based on the initial probable cause” upon
which the detention was allegedly based. 257

253. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d. at 670–71 (“[I]f the totality of the surrounding
circumstances indicates that a confession was voluntarily given, it shall
not be excluded from evidence solely because of a delay in carrying the
confessor before a magistrate.” (quoting State v. Readus, 764 S.W.2d 770,
774 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988))).
254. See, e.g., Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (discussing civil liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for tortious actions similar to false arrest).
255. Conley, Not Charged, supra note 195.
256. Judicial Commissioners Report, supra note 57, at 7.
257. Shelby County Commission Transcript, supra note 17, at 9.
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The problem with every one of these explanations is that each one
of these ends can be achieved just as well if the police were to follow
the conventional (and constitutional) procedure of charging the
defendant. Regardless of whether the defendant is detained after
charge or allowed to go home, the fact of a charge does not, in any
way, hinder the ability of law enforcement to review surveillance
videos, interview witnesses in hospitals, check out exculpatory
information, or conduct any other aspect of an ongoing investigation.
If such investigation reveals that different or additional charges
should be made, the prosecution may always amend the charging
document to add or substitute new charges.
If doing so requires that the police re-arrest a defendant
previously arrested but released pending trial within the first 48
hours, it would involve additional effort on the part of law
enforcement. Rather than simply going back to the 48-hour holding
cell to confront or re-book the defendant, police would be required to
find him again. However, query how much of a burden this actually
is. Presumably, if the defendant has been released pending trial, either
law enforcement or the court has determined that he is not a flight
risk. Having already once tracked down the defendant and having
presumably instructed him not to disappear pending trial, picking him
back up again to book him on new charges will likely not be a terribly
burdensome undertaking. At the very least, it does not seem to
outweigh the substantial liberty interest that innocent individuals
have in avoiding being detained for 48 hours without charge.
Critics of 48-hour holds suggest other reasons for preferring 48hour holds over simply arresting and charging suspects: the holds
allow law enforcement to do an end-run around procedural protections
given defendants who are arrested and charged. And the holds do
seem to avoid procedural protections in two interlocking ways. First,
48-hour holds afford police extra time to hold a suspect before the
clock starts ticking on a prompt bail determination. Second, they
avoid an otherwise applicable ban on interrogation of suspects outside
the presence of defense counsel. These additional licenses could allow
law enforcement to “sweat” a suspect to obtain waivers and
confessions that might otherwise not be legally obtainable. 258
C.

Bail

Persons detained under a 48-hour hold order cannot get bail, and
thus, cannot obtain release by being “bonded out.” 259 Thus, the 48-hour
258. See United States v. Roberts, 928 F. Supp. 910, 915 (W.D. Mo. 1996)
(“Here . . . the sole purpose of the pick-up was to hold Defendant until
she either cooperated or twenty hours expired. This is not permissible.”)
259. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, supra note 56, at 5 (citing deposition
testimony of Lauderdale County Sheriff Steve Sanders); Conley, Not
Charged, supra note 195; Conley, On the Hook, supra note 64, at A10.
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hold could be used to deny a detained person whatever rights he may
otherwise have to bail, or to a speedy determination of bail. This could
constitute either an improper motive for preferring the 48-hour holds to
a regular criminal charge, or an improper “windfall” to law enforcement
in those cases where the 48-hour hold was used with the effect (if not
the intent) of preventing the detainee from obtaining bail.
Even a person detained under a legal 48-hour hold is likely still
eligible for, and entitled to, bail under either federal or state law. The
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed.” 260
The Supreme Court has not expressly held that this amendment
applies to state prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause, but it has assumed that such incorporation
applies. 261 While the Eighth Amendment does not provide an absolute
right to bail, any bail set cannot be “excessive.” 262 Further, while
federal courts have provided no set time limit for a hearing, due
process entitles a defendant to a bail hearing, and to have such a
hearing without unnecessary delay. 263
In all jurisdictions, of course, it is necessary to have a charge in
order to set bail. That basic requirement suggests that, by delaying
the imposition of a charge for a minimum of 48 hours while the police
continue their investigation, 48-hour holds cause a significant delay in
a bail determination.
In the federal system, the time limits for such determinations are
set by statute. An arrestee is entitled to a prompt detention
hearing, 264 and the maximum length of pretrial detention is limited by
the deadlines imposed by the Speedy Trial Act. 265 Thus, federal law
entitles a defendant to a prompt determination of bail.

260. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
261. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979).
262. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754–55 (1987).
263. See, e.g., id. at 747 (“The arrestee is entitled to a prompt detention
hearing and the maximum length of pretrial detention is limited by the
stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act.” (internal citation
omitted)); United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 768 (7th Cir. 1985)
(“We recognize that, at some point, the length of delay may raise due
process objections and we urge that district courts expedite the trials of
those detained pending trial.”); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.
71, 83 (1992) (“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to
trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” (citing Salerno,
481 U.S. at 755)).
264. Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2006).
265. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006).
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A similar entitlement to bail in noncapital cases is set out in the
Tennessee Constitution. 266 On this point, state constitutional and
statutory provisions in Tennessee are generally similar to those in
other states. 267 Tennessee statutes fleshing out the general entitlement
specify that judges, magistrates, and court clerks may set bail, 268 how
the amount is determined, 269 and what restrictions on release may
accompany bail. 270 But the statutes do not explicitly guarantee a
prompt bail determination or set out a definite time for such a
determination to be made.
In most Tennessee counties, as is common throughout the
country, the probable cause hearing contemplated by Gerstein is part
of an “initial appearance” proceeding, which also involves the setting
of bail. 271 Thus, if a court meets the time limits imposed by Gerstein,
it will, as a practical matter, most likely be meeting any time limits
which may apply to a judicial hearing on bail.
Indeed, both federal and state courts dealing with claims of
unreasonable delay in access to bail and pretrial release have tended
to analogize to the 48-hour presumption set out in Gerstein for
probable cause determinations. They have held a bail hearing or bail
disposition timely if it meets the 48-hour deadline for a Gerstein
hearing. 272 On this basis, federal and state courts around the country
have upheld delays of 9 hours, 273 12 hours, 274 and 20 hours 275 between
266. Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-102
(2012) (recodifying the entitlement).
267. See, e.g., Wyo. Const. art. I, § 14; Wis. Const. art. I, § 8; Ariz.
Const. art. II, § 22; Nev. Const. art. I, § 7; Okla. Const. art II, § 8.
268. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-105 (2012).
269. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-118 (2012).
270. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-116 (2012).
271. State v. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d 666, 672 n.2 (Tenn. 1996) (citing
David Raybin, Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure
§ 3.2 (rev. ed. 2008); Office of the Attorney Gen. of the State
of Tenn., Opinion No. 91-84, at 3 (Sept. 20, 1991)).
272. See Tate v. Hartsville/Trousdale Cnty., No. 3:09-0201, 2010 WL
4054141, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 14, 2010) (“The clear import of
McLaughlin, then, is that a bail hearing held within forty-eight hours of
a warrantless arrest is also presumptively constitutional—if indeed the
Constitution speaks to that issue.”); Hopkins v. Bradley Cnty., 338
S.W.3d 529, 538–39 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) (“Given that a bail hearing
may be delayed up to forty-eight hours absent some improper motive,
the Court finds that a 12-hour delay in releasing Plaintiff in this case
did not amount to a constitutional deprivation.”).
273. Holder v. Town of Newton, No. CIV. 08-cvCVCV-197-JL, 2010 WL
432357, at *11 (D.N.H. Feb. 3, 2010), (finding a nine-hour delay
between defendant’s arrest and subsequent release on bail was “well
within the 48-hour window and thus presumptively constitutional”).

859

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3 ·2013
The Remarkably Resilient, Constitutionally Dubious 48-Hour Hold

booking and ability to make bail. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has stated
flatly that “[t]here is no right to post bail within 24 hours of
arrest.” 276
But these opinions allowing bail or pretrial release delays of 10 to
20 hours either referenced the local criminal justice system’s
administrative desire to wait to combine a bail hearing with another
type of hearing 277—flexibility recognized by the Supreme Court in
McLaughlin278—or did not involve situations where a magistrate was
available but simply failed, without reasonable excuse, to provide a
hearing. 279 These pragmatic reasons for a short delay—the unavailability of a magistrate on short notice or the desire to achieve
efficiency by combining a probable cause hearing with a bail hearing—
are the kinds of things the Supreme Court has expressly accepted.
At the same time, where such pragmatic excuses for delay did not
exist, the Court intended no bright-line safe harbor, no guarantee of
constitutionality whenever the hearing clocked in at forty-seven hours
and fifty-nine minutes. In McLaughlin, the Court emphasized that
while a probable cause hearing occurring within 48 hours of arrest is
presumptively constitutional, even that quick a hearing might violate
the Constitution if the magistrate were available sooner and there was

274. Lund v. Hennepin Cnty., 427 F.3d 1123, 1126–28 (8th Cir. 2005)
(finding no due process violation where defendant was held for twelve
hours after judge ordered that defendant could be released with no bail);
Tate, 2010 WL 4054141, at *8 (explaining that a policy of holding
domestic violence arrestees for twelve hours before allowing release on
bail did “not automatically constitute a constitutional violation”).
275. Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 640 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding
that city’s policy of holding domestic violence arrestees for a minimum
of 20 hours unless arraigned and released by the court did not violate
the Constitution).
276. Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 545 (5th Cir. 2004). Regardless of
the constitutional minimum, some states explicitly require by statute a
period of time less than 48 hours by which an arrestee must either be
charged or released. See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 544.170 (West 2012).
277. See, e.g., Tate, 2010 WL 4054141, at *8 (“The Supreme Court has
recognized that probable cause decisions must be made promptly, but
has also recognized that states should be given enough time to combine
such hearings with other preliminary procedures, including bail
determinations.”).
278. Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (“In evaluating
whether the delay in a particular case is unreasonable, however, courts
must allow a substantial degree of flexibility.”).
279. See, e.g., Turner, 412 F.3d at 640 (noting that the plaintiff could not
argue the policy was unconstitutional because “the policy does not
prohibit arraignment within the first 20 hours if a magistrate is
available”).
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no adequate explanation for the delay. 280 For this reason, lower courts
upholding delays of less than 48 hours in obtaining bail have
nonetheless been mindful of the possibility that such delays might still
be unconstitutional if there were no reason for them. 281
The typical 48-hour hold seems to present precisely such a denial
of bail review without reason. In Shelby County, for example, a
Judicial Commissioner is available 24 hours a day to deal with such
matters. 282 Indeed, during a typical arrest, a Judicial Commissioner
routinely sets bail at the time an arrestee is booked. This prompt
determination of bail, one which as a practical matter is available to
all, is not available to those detained on a 48-hour hold.
So while the law in this area may not be clear, it appears that 48hour hold detainees have some right to a prompt bail determination,
and that their entitlement would be analyzed as analogous to the
right of a prompt probable cause determination. If that is so, the 48hour hold virtually doubles the time suspects can be held without
getting the matter of pretrial detention and bail resolved. The “hold”
procedure adds a preliminary 48-hour period before the clock even
starts ticking on resolving the issue of pretrial detention and bail. In
this respect, 48-hour holds give the state an advantage at the expense
of defendants’ rights.
There is no recorded use of this 48-hour hold procedure in the
federal system. Any such use would trigger similar constitutional
concerns about detention without probable cause, without a charge,
and without a prompt determination of bail.
In other states, another question that arises is whether the
reasons behind the policies of extended detention of domestic abuse
suspects justify holding a suspect beyond the point at which a
magistrate is available. The reason behind such policies is clear: they
are designed to protect victims of domestic violence by preventing
their alleged abusers from obtaining release too soon. As one state
court has put it, “In many instances there are valid reasons for
keeping an individual in jail for the twenty hours . . . . This is so

280. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56 (explaining that a hearing within 48 hours
may nonetheless be unconstitutional if “the arrested individual can
prove that his or her probable cause determination was delayed
unreasonably”).
281. Davis v. City of Detroit, No. 98-1254, 1999 WL 1111482, at *1 (6th Cir.
Nov. 24, 1999) (holding that the plaintiff should have been allowed to
proceed with his claim that defendants held domestic violence arrestees
for a minimum of 20 hours even if a magistrate was available).
282. Mike Matthews, City Attorney Orders Stop to 48 Hour Holds by Memphis
Police, ABC 24 (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.abc24.com/news/local/
story/City-Attorney-Orders-Stop-to-48-hour holds-by/MPb-YW8huUGd
EgKqe2aWPA.cspx (quoting District Attorney Amy Weirich).
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especially in instances of domestic abuse where continued violence is
a threat.” 283
On the one hand, this is not extending a detention for no reason
at all, and thus is arguably not as constitutionally suspect as a generic
48-hour hold policy. An articulable reason that is at least superficially
valid—that is, protecting domestic abuse victims—does exist. On the
other hand, such a domestic-violence-specific policy results in
unnecessarily prolonging the pretrial detention of persons presumed
innocent under the law, based on a categorical assumption that all
persons accused of that crime represent a public safety threat. In
upholding a federal statute providing for preventive detention based
on future dangerousness, the Supreme Court emphasized that a court
was required to make a case-specific finding, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the defendant represented a danger of committing
further crimes. 284 In this case, there is no requirement of a judicial
finding that the defendant presents a danger to the alleged victim, or
anyone else.
At least some laws designed to achieve heightened protection to
domestic abuse victims set out some criteria beyond the initial
accusation of domestic abuse. For example, Michigan has a statute
providing for warrantless arrest in domestic violence cases if the suspect
had a child in common with the victim, resides in the same household,
or is a current or former spouse of the victim.285 It is doubtful whether
such a statute providing for extended warrantless detention of suspects
meeting these criteria (even where a magistrate was available to make a
probable cause determination) would pass constitutional muster, even
with such criteria added. Without any such criteria, policies unnecessarily prolonging warrantless detention in an entire category of cases
seem even more constitutionally vulnerable.
D.

Right to Counsel

Additional concerns arise that the 48-hour holds may afford a
“loophole” around the restrictions on interrogation created by the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. This is so because law enforcement agents
commonly question suspects while they are detained under the 48-hour
hold. For example, this occurred in the Bishop case, and led to
suppression of a statement obtained as a result.286
283. In re Conard, 944 S.W.2d 191, 201 (Mo. 1997).
284. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750–52 (1987) (“[T]he
Government must convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and
convincing evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure
the safety of the community or any person.”).
285. Mich. Comp. Laws § 764.15a (2012).
286. State v. Bishop, No. W2010-01207-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 938969, at
*5–6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 2012) (“Lieutenant Ragland
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As noted above, the federal rule is that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel attaches once the “adversarial judicial proceedings” have
begun. 287 The Supreme Court has held that, at a minimum, this point
occurs when either the defendant has appeared before a magistrate or
there has been a “formal charge”—that is, the prosecutor has filed an
indictment, presentment, or information.288 Once the right attaches, law
enforcement agents may not “deliberately elicit” incriminating
information from the defendant outside the presence of defense counsel
absent a valid waiver. 289 This means, specifically, that police may not
engage in interrogation of the defendant.290
This protection from interrogation is independent of the
protections against custodial interrogation prior to being given
Miranda warnings, which stem from the Fifth Amendment selfincrimination privilege. 291 So, absent a waiver of Sixth Amendment
rights, even interrogation consistent with the principles of Miranda
still violates the Constitution, wherever such interrogation takes place
after the Sixth Amendment right has been triggered and outside the
presence of defense counsel. 292 Thus, under federal constitutional
principles, once a formal charge triggers the Sixth Amendment right,
police may not interrogate a defendant without his lawyer.
Without more, 48-hour holds would not normally violate this
constitutional right. They typically take place prior to the filing of a
formal charge (such as an indictment, information, or presentment)
by a prosecutor. In Tennessee, however, the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel applies also upon the issuance of an arrest warrant, because
Tennessee law considers an arrest warrant to be sufficient to initiate
“the adversarial judicial process.” 293 Where the defendant is arrested
pursuant to warrant, the protections against interrogation and other
intentional elicitation of incriminating information begin upon
maintained that the defendant was not under arrest but ‘was put on a
forty-eight-hour hold for investigation.’ ”), appeal granted, Aug. 15, 2012.
287. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 (1986) (citing United States v.
Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187–88 (1984)).
288. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 198 (2008); see also United
States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984) (right attaches upon “formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment”
(quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688–89 (1972))).
289. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431 (1986).
290. Id. at 432 (“[A]fter indictment, police may not elicit statements from
suspect out of the presence of counsel.”).
291. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
292. Moran, 475 U.S. at 431.
293. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d at 669 (“In Tennessee, the adversarial judicial
process is initiated at the time of the filing of the formal charge, such as
an arrest warrant.”).
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arrest. 294 Thus, in Tennessee, once police have arrested a defendant
who has not waived his rights pursuant to warrant, they must refrain
from interrogating him without a defense lawyer present. By allowing
police to detain a suspect without getting an arrest warrant, 48-hour
holds allow police to interrogate a suspect without having to abide by
the right-to-counsel protections which would otherwise apply. 295
However, defenders of the practice could argue that this is not a
realistic objection. Police can usually choose to make a warrantless
arrest once they have probable cause, using one of the many
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 296 Indeed, such warrantless
arrests account for the overwhelming majority of modern arrests. 297
Thus, they could argue, if the police truly wanted to avoid right-tocounsel restrictions on interrogating 48-hour hold detainees, they
could simply effect warrantless arrests. This undercuts the
characterization of 48-hour holds as sinister evasions of right-tocounsel protections.
This response has a certain merit, but is nonetheless questionable,
because the McLaughlin doctrine suggests that sometimes—for
example, where a magistrate is available and there is no
administrative need to combine a Gerstein hearing with other types of
hearings—an arrestee is entitled to appear before a magistrate in less
than 48 hours. 298 Indeed, federal and state rules of criminal procedure

294. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 5(a). Similarly, an arrest warrant must issue after
the police file an affidavit of complaint establishing probable cause.
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 4(a).
295. See, e.g., Buser et al., supra note 22 (quoting opponents making this
criticism). There is little reason to think that 48-hour holds are
themselves arrest warrants. In some cases, as in Lauderdale County,
police effect them without judicial ratification. Even where magistrates
are involved, as in Shelby County, 48-hour holds do not seem to be
treated as warrants: interrogations after the issuance of the hold order
occurred frequently without triggering Sixth Amendment–based
exclusions (as would otherwise be required in Tennessee), and the holds
were commonly followed by either an arrest warrant or a Gerstein
probable cause hearing, which is designed as an alternative to an arrest
warrant. Of course, if they were arrest warrants, then all interrogations
(absent waiver) following them clearly would be improper, and all
statements obtained therefrom would be subject to exclusion. Id.
296. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415 (1976) (allowing
warrantless arrests where suspect is found in public and there is
probable cause to suspect him of a felony).
297. Kamisar et al., supra note 230, at 8 n.h (“Arresting without first
obtaining a warrant is the predominant practice for felony arrests
throughout the nation.”).
298. See Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (holding
that warrantless arrestees must be brought before a magistrate without
any unreasonable delay, even within the 48 hour period; a delay “for the

864

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3 ·2013
The Remarkably Resilient, Constitutionally Dubious 48-Hour Hold

provide that once there is a warrantless arrest, police must bring the
defendant to a magistrate “without unnecessary delay.” 299 While this
may simply be codifying Gerstein and its progeny, it may also denote
a decision by the state to guarantee prompt judicial determination of
probable cause. Either way, it is the case that on many occasions, the
warrantless arrestee will have to be brought before a magistrate in
less than 48 hours. Once that occurs, the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is triggered and interrogation must cease. 300 So, by isolating
the defendant in an interrogation room but not calling it an “arrest,”
the 48-hour hold guarantees the police a full 48 hours to interrogate
the defendant, with less of an issue under McLaughlin or under Rule
5(a) of the federal and state rules of criminal procedure.
Another response to the argument that the holds are an evasion
of Sixth Amendment protections is grounded in Miranda v.
Arizona. 301 Since suspects in 48-hour holds are unquestionably in
“custody,” the Fifth Amendment restrictions on interrogation
established in Miranda would still apply, even without a charge.302
Thus, defenders of 48-hour holds could argue that suspects are still
afforded Fifth Amendment interrogation protections, even if Sixth
Amendment protections are somehow skillfully avoided.
But this response is also not fully persuasive because Fifth
Amendment protections are different from Sixth Amendment
protections in a crucial way. All the Fifth Amendment requires is that
suspects in custody be informed of their Miranda rights prior to
questioning. If they do not affirmatively invoke their rights by stating
that they prefer not to answer questions, or that they want to have a
lawyer present, interrogation may continue. 303 Thus, unless the
suspect in a 48-hour hold is savvy enough to affirmatively invoke his
rights, law enforcement may visit him in the holding cell and question
him about the case. Indeed, they may try to elicit a waiver of his

purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest” is
unreasonable).
299. Fed. R. Crim P. 5(a); see also Tenn. R. Crim. P. 5(a).
300. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428 (noting that the right to counsel
arises “after the first formal charging proceeding”).
301. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that statements
by defendants may not be used in evidence “unless it demonstrates the
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination”).
302. See id. at 467 (Miranda protections apply where there is custody and
interrogation).
303. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (an ambiguous
invocation does not require the cessation of interrogation).
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rights. 304 And, even if they are unsuccessful in obtaining an explicit
waiver (oral or written), the mere fact that the suspect was informed
of his rights, appeared to understand them, and later made an
admission could be enough by itself to constitute an “implied
waiver.” 305 By contrast, the Sixth Amendment protection is triggered
automatically by a formal charge, and it does not require the
defendant to affirmatively invoke the right. 306 Thus, once the Sixth
Amendment right applies, police may not initiate any conversation
with the suspect about the case or attempt to elicit any kind of
waiver. The most they can do is respond if the defendant initiates
discussion about the case. Thus, avoiding Sixth Amendment
protections through the guise of the 48-hour hold effectuates a
significant advantage to law enforcement.
In practice, this advantage can be a very helpful, very practical
one. Use of the holds affords police an opportunity to “sweat” a
suspect for 48 hours in an attempt to “soften him up” for questioning
toward the end of the 48-hour period. This process continues for 48
hours, before the clock even starts ticking on a bail determination. In
many cases, it continues without a solid case for probable cause. By
the end of this period, a suspect may be more willing to waive both
his Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights. From a
pragmatic policy perspective, one might view this as either a good
thing or a bad thing, depending on the seriousness of the crime and
whether the suspect is truly culpable. From a constitutional
perspective, it is troubling.

Conclusion
Forty-eight-hour holds represent a violation of fairly basic Fourth
Amendment rights. They provide for detention without charge and
without access to bail. Much of the time, they provide for detention
without probable cause. In Tennessee, they also seem to circumvent
right-to-counsel restrictions on interrogation.
Their sustained use in multiple jurisdictions around the country
raises troubling questions. To what extent were the detentions the
product of honest misunderstanding of the law by law enforcement,
304. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 423–24 (1986) (affirming the validity of
a waiver even though the “withholding of information [by police] is
objectionable as a matter of ethics”).
305. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010) (“Where the
prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was
understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes
an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.”)
306. See Moran, 475 U.S. at 428 (affirming the “right to the presence of an
attorney during any interrogation occurring after the first formal
charging procedure”).
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and to what extent were they the product of cynical bending of rules?
Either way, why has it persisted so long? Why didn’t the courts put a
stop to it sooner? Why does it apparently continue in at least some
local jurisdictions?
In part, the answer lies in local courts who were themselves
misinformed regarding this aspect of criminal procedure. Perhaps this is
not surprising, given the byzantine complexity of current constitutional
criminal procedure doctrine—a complexity borne of shifting ideological
majorities on the Supreme Court and the Court’s reluctance to honestly
overrule precedents rather than distinguish them to death. At the same
time, there are nontrivial limitations on ways to formally bring this
matter to the attention of the courts. As a practical matter, to file a
civil lawsuit challenging the practice and have a reasonable prospect of
obtaining a significant money judgment, lawyers would want a plaintiff
detained under the procedure, willing to sue, and lacking a criminal
record, all of which could be a difficult find.
Another explanation may lie in sheer institutional inertia. There
is a natural tendency for any institution to resist calls for change,
especially when those calls come in the form of accusations that the
institution is systematically violating the Constitution. Overcoming
that inertia—successfully prodding the local courts, police, and
prosecutors to change—requires sustained attention, perhaps more
sustained attention than busy practicing lawyers and journalists
could afford.
Whatever the explanation, the 48-hour holds should stop and not
resume. To that end, attorneys need to do a better job of explaining
basic constitutional principles to the lay public and to actors in the
criminal justice system. If that happens, maybe the next time we
discover a systematic constitutional violation in our criminal justice
system—and there will be a next time—it will take less than two
decades to remedy it.
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